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Despite years of significant legal improvements stemming from a renaissance in
public health law, Americans still face major challenges and barriers in assuring
their communal health. Reversals of legal reforms coupled with maligned policies
and chronic underfunding contribute to diminished public health outcomes.
Underlying preventable morbidity and mortality nationally are realities of our
existing constitutional infrastructure. In essence, there is no general obligation of
government to protect or promote the public’s health. Under principles of
“constitutional cohesion,” structural facets and rights-based principles interwoven
within the Constitution protect individuals and groups from governmental vices
(i.e., oppression, overreaching, tyranny, and malfeasance). Structural
impediments and rights infringements provide viable options to challenge
governmental efforts inapposite to protecting the public’s health. Through corollary
applications framed as auxiliary, creative, and ghost righting, courts are also
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empowered to recognize core duties or rights that the Constitution may not
explicitly denote, but assuredly contains, to remedy identifiable vices. Notably,
ghost righting charts a course for recognizing a constitutional right to public
health that Americans are owed, and government must respect, to assure basic
public health needs.
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INTRODUCTION
Laws have been used for centuries to address threats to the pub1
lic’s health, sometimes in invidious, inconsistent, or unsubstanti2
ated ways. In the late 1990s, however, scholars and policymakers
began championing a “renaissance” in public health law and poli1.
While historic and modern definitions of what constitutes “public health” vary extensively, for purposes of this manuscript, public health may be defined in the broadest conception as “what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be
healthy.” INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988).
2.
See, e.g., JAMES G. HODGE, JR., PUBLIC HEALTH IN A NUTSHELL 135 (3d ed. 2018)
[hereinafter HODGE, JR., NUTSHELL] (“In addition to public health powers to test, screen,
treat, and vaccinate . . . [s]ocial distancing powers including quarantine, isolation, curfew,
and closure are among the oldest (and some may say the most antiquated) public health
measures. Although wielded historically in ways that occasionally castigated affected persons,
social distancing powers are not punitive per se.”).
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cy. Bolstered by new and progressive definitions of the field, public health laws moved beyond traditional boundaries focused typically on controlling infectious diseases to serve as distinct tools to
promote communal health with greater respect for individual
rights. Antiquated federal, state, and local laws featuring heavyhanded approaches under the guise of public health were amend5
ed or dispelled. Enlightened model law approaches and jurisprudence increasingly reflected a balance of communal and individual
interests to reach a legal equilibrium that, in turn, contributed to
tangible health outcomes.
To date, the public health law renaissance has unquestionably
altered perceptions of the role of law to improve health outcomes
through extensive, revolutionary legal and policy reforms. These
reforms and their public health benefits, however, are at significant risk. Rollbacks, rescissions, and repudiations of solidified public health principles and “best practices” dominate political agen6
das at all levels of government. National health law reforms are
7
under siege, spearheaded by proposed repeals or judicial under8
9
mining of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which extended health
3.
Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law: A Renaissance, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 136,
137 (2002) (calling for conformity among modern scientific and legal standards, consistency
in efforts among states, and uniformity in approaching diverse public health threats through
law); Lawrence O. Gostin, F. Ed Thompson & Frank P. Grad, The Law and the Public’s Health:
The Foundations, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 42 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2d
ed. 2007) (“Public health law is experiencing a period of renaissance in the United States.”).
4.
Professor Gostin defines public health law as “the study of the legal powers and duties of the state . . . to ensure the conditions for people to be healthy (to identify, prevent,
and ameliorate risks to health in the population) and of the limitations on the power of the
state to constrain for the common good the autonomy, privacy, liberty, proprietary, and
other legally protected interests of individuals.” LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:
POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 4 (2d ed. 2008). Professor Parmet notes, “[p]ublic health law . . .
focuses on the authority of government agencies charged with protecting public health as
well as the rights of individuals subject to such regulations.” WENDY E. PARMET,
POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 212 (2009). Based on these approaches, public
health law is defined for purposes of this manuscript as: “laws (e.g., constitutional, statutory,
regulatory, judicial), legal processes, or policies at every level of government (e.g., federal,
tribal, state, local) that: (1) are primarily designed to assure the conditions for people to be
healthy; or (2) concern structural or rights-based limitations on the powers of government
to act in the interests of communal health.” HODGE, JR., NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 14.
5.
See TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 1-101 (2003); see also James G.
Hodge, Jr. et al., Transforming Public Health Law: The Turning Point Model State Public Health
Act, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 77, 77 (2006) [hereinafter Hodge, Jr. et al., Transforming Public
Health Law].
6.
James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Emerging Legal Threats to the Public’s Health, 46 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 547 (2018).
7.
See C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & JANET KINZER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LEGISLATIVE
ACTIONS IN THE 112TH, 113TH, AND 114TH CONGRESSES TO REPEAL, DEFUND, OR DELAY THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (Feb. 7, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43289.pdf.
8.
Texas v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 3d 665 (N. D. Tex. 2018) (holding that the
ACA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional authority absent an effective tax penalty for the ACA’s individual mandate provision following Congress’ 2017 enactment of the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act); see also Paul Krugman, Op-ed: Conservatism’s Monstrous Endgame, N.Y.
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care access and coverage to millions of Americans. Public health
sciences are debunked or outright ignored in favor of private in10
dustry interests or draconian threats of criminal sanctions in re11
sponse to public health crises. Each of the last five years is among
the hottest ever in recorded history, yet federal authorities blatant12
ly ignore environmental interventions. Deregulatory efforts in
health care, housing, and education are reversing decades of public health achievements and gains to address health disparities and
social determinants of health. Preemptive efforts stymying state
and local public health legal innovations are a common tactic
13
among some federal and state lawmakers. Prevailing federal and
state health and tax policies favoring the wealthy fall hard on lower
14
and middle classes diminishing their ability to lead healthy lives.
Even as national expenditures on health care costs continue to
15
rise to unprecedented levels, public health budgets at all levels of
16
government have been decimated. A grossly underfunded and
underperforming public health system allows for the spread of
communicable diseases and the rise of some chronic conditions
17
and injuries. Consequently, many Americans are sinking deeper
into a cesspool of preventable poor health outcomes. Life expec-

TIMES, Dec. 18, 2018, at A22 (“What Nancy Pelosi called the ‘monstrous endgame’ of the
Republican assault on health care is just the leading edge of an attack on multiple fronts, as
the G.O.P. tries to overturn the will of the voters and undermine democracy in general.”).
9.
42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
10.
Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Politics “Trumps” Health in America, O’NEILL INSTITUTE
(July 23, 2018), http://oneill.law.georgetown.edu/politics-trumps-health-in-america/ (“[I]t
seems politics trumps health, emboldened by a President and his Cabinet appointees who
prioritize the rich over the poor and big business over healthy communities.”).
11.
Lawrence O. Gostin, James G. Hodge, Jr. & Chelsea L. Gulinson, Supervised Injection
Facilities Legal and Policy Reforms, 321 JAMA 745, 746 (2019) (quoting Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein “[Jurisdictions] should expect [DOJ] to meet the opening of any [Supervised Injection Facilities] with swift and aggressive action.”).
12.
John Schwartz & Nadja Popovich, 2018 Continues Warming Trend, As 4th Hottest Year
Since 1880, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2019, at A1.
13.
James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Public Health Preemption Plus, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 156,
156 (2017) (preemptive efforts “include political posturing and legal efforts to directly
threaten state or local public agencies or officials, withdraw or deny local funds, and strip
regulatory authorities”).
14.
Robert Pear et al., Trump to Scrap Critical Health Care Subsidies, Hitting Obamacare
Again, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/us/politics/
trump-obamacare-executive-order-health-insurance.html.
15.
Robert Pear, Growth of Health Care Spending Slowed Last Year, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/us/politics/us-health-spending-2017.html
(noting that health spending in the U.S. equaled $3.5 trillion last year, up 3.9% from 2016,
or about $10,740 a person, and nearly 18% of the gross domestic product).
16.
David Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, Public Health’s Falling Share of US Spending, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 56 (2016) (“Public health’s share of total health expenditures
[was] 3.18% in 2002, [but] then fell to 2.65% in 2014; it is projected to fall to 2.40% in
2023.”).
17.
Id.
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tancy among all Americans, notably specific subpopulations, has
19
actually gone down for the first time in decades. Today’s youth
may live shorter lives than their parents due largely to public
health failures nationally.
Changes in laws and policies threaten the continuity of the
modern public health law renaissance absent aggressive efforts to
realign national and regional priorities to further communal
20
health. Diminutions in American public health outcomes, however, are not a foregone conclusion thanks to affirmative counterefforts of legislators, policymakers, ethicists, and scholars. Collectively, they are generating an array of hard and soft law approaches
to advance communal health. Legislatures articulate multiple principles supporting government’s obligations to counter specific
21
public health threats. Policymakers promote a litany of interventions, including suing and shaming government officials, to ad22
vance public health. Ethicists conceptualize practical models of
public health ethics that require or support governmental respon23
sibilities. Human rights advocates push for greater respect for
24
rights-based access to basic health services. Enhanced notions of
principles of health equity and justice foster fairness in public
25
health and health care services across populations.

18.
Bindu Kalesan et al., Cross-sectional Study of Loss of Life Expectancy at Different Ages Related to Firearm Deaths Among Black and White Americans, 24 BMJ EVIDENCE-BASED MED., 1,1
(2018) (documenting how life expectancies for African Americans are actually several years
less than for Caucasian Americans due mostly to public health impacts of gun violence on
African Americans).
19.
Jennifer Karas Montez, Deregulation, Devolution, and State Preemption Laws’ Impact on
US Mortality Trends, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1749, 1749 (2017) (citing the National Center
for Health Statistics, “between 2014 and 2015, life expectancy at birth for the nation as a
whole declined by 0.1 years”).
20.
James G. Hodge, Jr., Revisiting the Renaissance in Public Health Law, 46 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 1031, 1033 (2019) (“For the renaissance to thrive . . . public and private actors
should reconsider how law may accomplish varied ends without constraining its capacity to
address multifarious challenges.”).
21.
Hodge, Jr., et al., Transforming Public Health Law, supra note 5, at 77–79.
22.
Lance Gable & James W. Buehler, Criticized, Fired, Sued, or Prosecuted: Hindsight and
Public Health Accountability, 132 PUB. HEALTH REP. 676, 676 (2017) (following the Flint water
crisis the director of the Michigan state health department and others were publically criticized, sued, and prosecuted).
23.
See, e.g., Nancy E. Kass, An Ethics Framework for Public Health, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1776 (2001); James C. Thomas et al., A Code of Ethics for Public Health, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1057 (2002); James Childress et al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 170, 175–76 (2002).
24.
Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Seventy Years of Human Rights in Global Health: Drawing on
a Contentious Past to Secure a Hopeful Future, 392 LANCET 2731 (2018).
25.
Sandro Galea, The Real Reason Why American Lives Are Getting Shorter, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinion-life-expectancyamericans_us_ 5c098 2b0e4b0b6cdaf5d37c8 (stating that the opioid epidemic emerges from
the social, economic, and political context of contemporary American life, and without addressing this context, the problem will not be solved); cf. MADISON POWERS & RUTH FADEN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH POLICY (2006).

178

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 53:1

These meaningful efforts are influential and impactful, especially within certain populations. Yet, they are also collectively insufficient to assure Americans’ public health needs. Legal patches and
ethical aspirations alone do not administer vaccines, conduct disease surveillance, provide basic treatments, or assure other core
26
public health services. They do not prevent government inaction
amidst public health crises or fairly allocate benefits and risks
across populations. While some governmental entities, particularly
at the state and local levels, may choose to legally act to provide
core functions, many do not. With divergent views among the
courts, government leaders too often stand idle as populations suffer from largely preventable conditions (e.g., infectious diseases,
obesity, addiction, injuries). Preventing or proactively addressing
these conditions early on would take pennies on the dollar compared to the costs of resulting harms and associated treatments.
Despite the enormous achievements extending from the public
health law renaissance, clear and substantial risks to population
health remain. This failure of the renaissance reflects an interpretive reality of our existing constitutional infrastructure. In essence,
there is no affirmative obligation of government to protect or promote the
public’s health. Except in special cases, government does not have to
act to assure the health of communities through provision of basic
public health services. As a result, from a constitutional point of
view, any benefits societies derive from public health interventions
are subject to the whim of governmental authorities. Lacking constitutional requirements to act, populations are left riding a roller
coaster of selective, fleeting interventions determined by everchanging administrations.
Americans should not have to endure such indignities and
threats to their health. Yet, solutions to the paucity and discontinuity of public health services are elusive because of a lack of constitutional support for basic public health services. Just because the
26.
What constitutes “core public health services” is subject to identification and refinement for purposes of setting legally-recognized duties. Traditional public health services
include epidemiological investigations, testing, screening, surveillance, vaccination, social
distancing measures, inspections, and nuisance abatement. Cf. HODGE, JR., NUTSHELL, supra
note 2, at 11–12, 26. These services, however, do not reflect the scope of modern public
health interventions designed to assure conditions for people to be healthy. Cf. INSTITUTE
OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988). The federal Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) describes ten essential public health services that all communities should engage in addressing social determinants of health inequities (SDOH).
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE TEN ESSENTIAL PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES
(2014),
https://www.cdc.gov/publichealthgateway/publichealthservices/pdf/essentialphs.pdf. These services include monitoring community health through active health assessments; addressing social and structural determinants of health inequities through collaborative, outreach, and education efforts; ensuring a competent health care workforce; and
evaluating service program effectiveness.
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Constitution does not explicitly provide for communal health
rights does not mean that such rights do not exist. Crafting a
broader right to public health entails nuanced or ephemeral interpretations of constitutionally-grounded concepts embedded in
its structure and other norms. Consistent with defined principles
27
of “constitutional cohesion” and corollary applications of these prin28
ciples known as “ghost righting,” courts are empowered to recognize or create core duties or rights that the Constitution may not
explicitly denote, but assuredly contains. That constitutional obligations of government to protect the public’s health can arise al29
most from “thin air” may seem fanciful, but it is viable when necessary to address known governmental vices (e.g., oppression,
30
overreaching, tyranny, malfeasance).
As addressed in the sections below, crafting an affirmative “constitutional right to public health” in theory (Part I) and application
(Part II) is not merely about sustaining a renaissance in public
health law. Rather, it is about crafting a new assessment of the
breadth of constitutional interpretation (Part III) essential to avert
the specter of preventable morbidity and mortality through the
generation of an original “right to public health” (Part IV) benefitting all Americans in the twenty-first century.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL COHESION: IN THEORY

Determining that government has an affirmative legal duty to
protect and promote the public’s health is invariably tied to the
U.S. Constitution based on (1) its structure and (2) the rights it
protects. First, constitutional structural arguments grounded in
principles of federalism, separation of powers, and preemption
surface in light of interjurisdictional disputes and policies. Protecting the public’s health is a primary (even if unstated) function of
government at all levels (federal, state, local) and branches (legislative, executive, judicial). As governments seek to respond to this
essential function, structural conflicts between different levels and
divisions invariably arise.

27.
See infra Parts II and III.
28.
See infra Part IV.
29.
Sometimes even “fanciful” ideas emerging from popular discourse become mainstream, including calls for greater access to health care services enveloped in “Medicare for
All” proposals surfacing again as campaign platforms for the 2020 Presidential election. See
Maggie Astor, Once Radical, Now Mainstream: Explaining Shifts in Discourse, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
25, 2019, at A18.
30.
See infra Part I, Figure 2.
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Second, while governmental public health agencies routinely
encourage voluntary, positive changes in individual or community
health behaviors, they are also empowered legally to mandate pub31
lic health efforts among private individuals and entities. Consequently, mandatory public health powers regularly implicate rightsbased constitutional principles, including due process, equal pro32
tection, or freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion.
That public health law entails structural and rights-based constitutional concepts is obvious. Less clear is how best to assess and
apply them. Legal scholars, judges, policymakers, practitioners,
and students are apt to separate structural and rights-based constitutional arguments when considering or challenging varied public
33
health laws. This makes intuitive sense. Discrete constitutional arguments flow logically from the nature of a purported violation.
For example, when one level of government intrudes on the interests of another level, infringements are often framed in terms of
34
federalism. If Congress attempts to legislate in an area of public
35
health typically reserved to states via the Tenth Amendment, fed36
eralism arguments by offended states may naturally follow.
Conversely, when government acts under the guise of public
health to derail or infringe on individual interests, rights-based objections emerge. If a state-level public health agency seeks to use its
social distancing powers (e.g., quarantine, isolation, curfews) that
unjustifiably infringe on a person’s freedom of movement, an individual may raise liberty-based objections extending from principles
37
of substantive or procedural due process.
These intuitive constitutional responses, however, are not always
the norm. Historical and modern conceptions of constitutional cohesion support how structural facets and rights-based principles are

31.
See HODGE, JR., NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 85 (citing ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE
POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 3–4 (1904)). Most state and local public health powers are derived from the “police powers,” historically defined as “the inherent
authority of the state to enact laws and promulgate regulations to protect, preserve and
promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people.”
32.
Cf. GOSTIN, supra note 4, at 85–86.
33.
Ozan O. Varol, Structural Rights, 105 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1054 (2017) (pigeonholing
“structures” and “rights” into distinct buckets negates the opportunity to examine how to fit
them into a coherent, harmonious whole).
34.
HODGE, JR., NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 33–39.
35.
U.S. CONST. amend. X (“[T]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”).
36.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding it is outside Congress’ commerce power to determine criminal sanctions for the mere possession of firearms near
school zones).
37.
See, e.g., Kirk v. Wyman, 65 S.E. 387 (S.C. 1909) (striking down a quarantine order
served on an elderly woman with leprosy in part because she was removed from her home to
an unsafe pesthouse without justification given her lack of infectivity).
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interwoven within the fabric of federal or state constitutions (see
Figure 1).
FIGURE 1. CONSTITUTIONAL COHESION

The concept is derived from expressed views among constitutional
Framers, legal scholars, policymakers, and courts assessing how varied constitutional principles work in tandem to stabilize governments and preserve individual freedoms. In San Antonio Independent
39
School District v. Rodriguez (1973), the Supreme Court links federal40
ism with assessments of principles of equal protection. In Printz v.
41
United States (1997), it cites the Federalist Papers supporting its
proposition that constitutional structural components (e.g., separation of powers and federalism) are both designed to protect in42
dividual liberty. The Court equates structural provisions in Na-

38.
Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1531
(1991) (advocating for the use of an “ordered liberty” model to approach issues of separation of powers to further the purpose of protecting citizens from tyranny. Principles of ordered liberty assimilate constitutional cohesion to the extent they acknowledge how structural and rights-based provisions align).
39.
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding Texas’ school financing system did not violate equal
protection because the system assured a basic education for every child via state contributions to each district and was not the product of purposeful discrimination against any
class).
40.
Id. at 43.
[E]very claim arising under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for the
relationship between national and state power under our federal system. Questions of federalism are always inherent in the process of determining whether a
State’s laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption of constitutionality, or
are to be subjected instead to rigorous judicial scrutiny.
41.
521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating firearm purchase background checks required by
federal law to be conducted by state officials as unconstitutional).
42.
Id. at 921.
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tional Labor Relations Board v. Canning (2014) as “no less critical to
preserving liberty than the later adopted provisions of the Bill of
44
Rights.” Some Framers, intimates the Court, assert that the Bill of
Rights is unnecessary on the premise that existing constitutional
provisions providing checks and balances are sufficient to protect
45
individual liberties.
Multiple scholars concur. Professor J. Harvie Wilkinson argues
that there is no firewall between structure and rights: “guarantees
of rights and principles of structure are sprinkled throughout [the
46
Constitution].” The Framers’ vision centered on the primacy of
democratic processes and the premise that state sovereignty is only
achievable if structural- and rights-based provisions of the Constitu47
tion align. Professor Akhil Reed Amar suggests that structure and
48
rights are tightly interwoven. “Structural overtones” like federalism are vital to protecting liberty interests from governmental
49
overreaching.
The intersection of constitutional structural foundations and
rights is undeniable because they are designed to accomplish primarily the same end: protect individuals and groups from identifiable
50
government vices. Government acts (or omissions) constituting vices are universally disdained by law- and policy-makers as well as the
public. Consequently, governmental vices are constitutionally susceptible to diminution or extinction. These vices, forged from
common law traditions and Framers’ original perspectives, include
governmental acts of oppression, overreaching, tyranny, and mal51
feasance (see Figure 2), as defined and explained below.

43.
134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (holding that president’s recess appointments, made in
three days between two pro forma sessions of the U.S. Senate, violated the Recess Appointments Clause).
44.
Id. at 2593.
45.
Id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 435 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(To the extent structural components sufficiently protect individual liberties, the Bill of
Rights arguably allows claims to more powers than those explicitly enumerated by the Constitution.).
46.
J. Harvie Wilkinson, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1691, 1707
(2004) (arguing that the structure of the Constitution is largely disregarded in favor of a
rights-based view).
47.
Id.
48.
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132 (1991)
(“A close look at the Bill [of Rights] reveals structural ideas tightly interconnected with language of rights.”).
49.
See, id.
50.
See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 453 (1991) (quoting Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)) (“The ‘constitutionally mandated balance of
power’ between the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of ‘our fundamental liberties.’”).
51.
Based in part on THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
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FIGURE 2. GOVERNMENTAL VICES

A. Oppression
Oppression refers to the undue exercise of power via governmen52
tal imposition of unwarranted burdens. The Framers clearly recognized the need to protect individuals against governmental op53
pression through an independent judiciary and principles of
54
substantive due process. Regarding expansive notions of the con55
cept of liberty, Justice Cardozo notes in Palko v. Connecticut (1937)
“it was recognized [long ago] that liberty is something more than
exemption from physical restraint, and that even in the field of
substantive rights and duties the legislative judgment, if oppressive
56
and arbitrary, may be overridden by the courts.”
In Chambers v. Florida (1940), the Court holds that when police
officers “turn their questioning into an instrument of mental op52.
Oppression, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910) (defining oppression as “[t]he
misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury”).
53.
Judicial independence “is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights
of individuals from the effects of those ill humours, which” can, at times, lead to serious oppressions of the minor party in the community. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
54.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 18, at 91 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(“Shame and oppression erelong awaken their love of liberty.”); Treigle v. Acme Homestead
Assoc., 297 U.S. 189, 197 (1936) (holding that the police power “must be exercised for an
end which is in fact public and the means adopted must be reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end and must not be arbitrary or oppressive”).
55.
302 U.S. 319 (1937) (holding that a state law allowing the prosecution to appeal the
results of a criminal conviction by jury trial does not violate the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
56.
Id. at 327.
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pression” they violate constitutionally protected rights. In Southwest Telephone v. Danaher (1915), a utility regulation is deemed unconstitutional because the fine imposed on the company was “so
oppressive as to be nothing short of a takings,” depriving defend58
ants of property rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Courts are often bastions against oppressive acts of government,
but can sometimes acquiesce. In the Supreme Court’s infamous
59
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), racial segregation is held lawful on the premise that Fourteenth Amendment protections did
not extend to social rights violations. In the notorious World War
60
II case, Korematsu v. United States (1944), the Court upholds President Roosevelt’s order for the internment of Japanese Americans.
These outlier decisions disregarding oppressive acts are “stain[s]
61
on American jurisprudence,” that have subsequently been overturned.
B. Overreaching
Legally distinct from oppression is the vice of overreaching, or the
wrongful exercise of power outside of established limits, particularly structural limits like separation of powers. Any branch of government, legislative, executive, or judicial, may engage in overreaching. Courts, however, seem particularly concerned about
their capacity to overreach inapposite to separation of powers limi62
tations. In Degen v. United States (1996), Justice Kennedy explains.
“The extent of [judicial powers] must be delimited with care, for
there is a danger of overreaching when one branch of the Government, without the benefit of cooperation or correction from

57.
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940)).
58.
238 U.S. 482, 491 (1915) (invalidating $3,600 fine imposed on a telephone company for suspending patron service under established and uncontested regulations as arbitrary
and oppressive).
59.
163 U.S. 537, 541 (1896), abrogated by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60.
323 U.S. 214, 227 (1944), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (“Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history,
and—to be clear—has no place in law under the Constitution.”).
61.
Carl Takei, The Incarceration of Japanese Americans in World War II Does Not Provide a
Legal Cover for a Muslim Registry, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/
opinion/op-ed/la-oe-takei-constitutionality-of-japanese-internment-20161127-story.html; see
also Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998) (defining anti-canon as a term for cases which are so flawed that they are now taken as exemplars of bad legal decision making, such as Lochner, Plessy, and Korematsu).
62.
517 U.S. 820 (1996) (holding that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine did not permit the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the government in a civil forfeiture case, on grounds that the claimant was outside the U.S. and could not be extradited to
face federal drug charges).
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the others, undertakes to define its own authority.” In the Supreme
63
Court’s death penalty case, Furman v. Georgia (1972), then Justice
Rehnquist elucidates further in dissent: “[w]hile overreaching by
the Legislative and Executive Branches may result in the sacrifice
of individual protections that the Constitution was designed to secure against action of the State, judicial overreaching may result in
sacrifice of the equally important right of the people to govern
64
themselves.”
In the 2016 abortion rights case, Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v.
65
Schmidt, concurring Judge Gordon Atcheson of the Kansas Court
of Appeals eloquently calls for exacting judicial review related to
Kansas’ constitutional right to self-determination. “Doing otherwise,” he concludes, “vaults legislation ahead of an elemental constitutional barrier to governmental overreach, undercutting the very purpose of a bill of rights in shielding a select set of fundamental
precepts from the vicissitudes of politics and the cravenness of pol66
iticians” (emphasis added). As per the court, corrections for legislative overreach find their source through judicial adherence to
fundamental constitutional norms.
C. Tyranny
Tyranny refers to the excessive accumulation and use of powers
67
in a singular entity. The Framers recognized the threat that tyr68
anny poses to individual liberty and freedoms. To guard against it,
society must be protected generally against oppression by its leaders, and minorities must not be subjected to the unfettered will of
69
majorities.
63.
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (invalidating the death penalty, as customarily
prescribed and implemented, based on a violation of cruel and unusual punishments prohibited via the Eighth Amendment).
64.
Id. at 470.
65.
368 P.3d 667 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that the Kansas Constitution’s Bill of
Rights provides the same protection for abortion rights as the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
66.
Id. at 328.
67.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 245 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (denoting
“[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny”). Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines
tyranny as (1) “oppressive power,” inherently having some external effect, and (2) “a government in which absolute power is vested in a single ruler,” focusing just on accumulation
of power. Tyranny, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
tyranny (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).
68.
See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (noting that if one branch exercises powers assigned to another branch, resulting laws would be
arbitrary and in contravention of principles of liberty).
69.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 at 266–67 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
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Justice Kennedy clarifies in Loving v. United States (1998) that
deterrence of tyranny is one “reason for dispersing the federal
71
power among three branches.” “Even before the birth of this
country,” he notes, separation of powers is known as an effective
72
“defense against tyranny.” Justice O’Connor attributes structural
federalism with alleviating the risks of tyranny in Gregory v. Ashcroft
(1991): “[j]ust as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will
73
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.” Tyranny
flourishes when government abdicates its responsibility to assure
proper checks and balances. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
74
clarified and reigned in unfettered executive power. In his concurring opinion in Department of Transportation v. Association of Amer75
ican Railroads (2015), Justice Thomas, quoting William Blackstone’s commentaries on the English Constitution, characterizes a
tyrannical government “as one in which ‘the right both of making
and of enforcing the laws . . . is vested in one and the same [per76
son], or one and the same body of [people].’” Still, as with oppression, the Court has at times endorsed or permitted excessive
executive powers. In Trump v. Hawaii (2018), it affirms an immigration policy targeting vulnerable minorities on the premise that
the judiciary lacks the capacity to question executive branch judg77
ments. Cases like these illustrate the complexities of limiting tyranny against the backdrop of core separation of powers principles.
70.
517 U.S. 748 (1996) (Separation-of-powers principles do not preclude Congress
from delegating its constitutional authority to the President to define aggravating factors
that permit imposition of statutory penalty of death in military capital cases.).
71.
Id. at 757.
72.
Id. at 756. It is a “basic principle of our constitutional scheme that one branch of
the Government may not intrude upon the central prerogatives of another.” Id. at 757.
73.
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (holding that Missouri state judges
constitute appointees “on a policymaking level,” within the meaning of exclusion to Federal
Age Discrimination in Employment Act; consequently, Missouri Constitution’s mandatory
retirement provision for judges does not violate equal protection).
74.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863, 868 (1952) (invalidating
Presidential Executive Order No. 10340 directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the nation’s steel mills).
75.
135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015) (finding Amtrak is a governmental entity, rather than autonomous private entity, for purposes of determining the validity of metrics and standards
created under Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act).
76.
Id. at 1244. Justice Thomas notes that separation of powers is in direct opposition to
tyranny as espoused by the Framers, citing FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
77.
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018) (upholding a travel ban for entry
of nationals of Muslim countries as within the President’s statutory authority and First
Amendment Establishment Clause); Elizabeth Goiten, Trump v. Hawaii: Giving Pretext a Pass,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (June 27, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/trump-vhawaii-giving-pretext-pass (explaining that courts lack authority to question executive decisions regarding immigration or national security).

FALL 2019]

The Right to Public Health

187

D. Malfeasance
Malfeasance represents an amalgam of reprehensible governmental abuses. Generally stated, it relates to unlawful or corrupt
78
acts by governmental agents or within governmental entities.
79
Some examples of malfeasance extend from positive actions; oth80
ers relate to abject failures. Traditionally, courts do not consistently distinguish between positive acts and omissions in labeling
81
fault. Malfeasance may thus arise where a governmental agent or
entity acts inappropriately or fails to act when required or obligat82
ed to do so.
Drawing distinctions over governmental acts or omissions as the
source of malfeasance may seem non-purposeful when harm to the
public’s health is at stake. Still, the Supreme Court has historically
centered on this distinction at least for purposes of assessing liability. In Dalehite v. United States (1953), it rejects the notion that the
federal government is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act
“for failure to impose a quarantine” in a hypothetical disease out83
break. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services
(1989), it holds that liberty interests under substantive due process
do not require county employees to act to protect minors at risk of
78.
In the context of tort law, misfeasance may be defined as “an act which a reasonably
prudent person would not do, or failing to do something which a reasonably prudent person would do.” Brian D. Bender, Torts: The Failings of the Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinction
and the Special Relationship Requirement in the Criminal Acts of Third Persons—State v. Back, 37
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 390, 391 (2010) (quoting Lewis v. Razzberries, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 437,
441 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)).
79.
Malfeasance is characterized by performing an act one should not perform. See Actions and Remedies Against Government Units and Public Officers for Nonfeasance, 11 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 101, 105, n. 71 (1979).
80.
Nonfeasance is commonly defined as a failure to act most often pursuant to an obligation to do so. See id. at 103. Some theorize, however, that nonfeasance includes omissions
even in the absence of a duty to act. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 78, at 391.
81.
Compare Smith v. Iowa City, 239 N.W. 29 (Iowa 1931) (holding that a municipal
agency’s failure to maintain safe park conditions was nonfeasance, not malfeasance), with
Commercial News Co. v. Beard, 116 Ill. App. 501 (1904) (holding that the government’s
failure to enforce a gambling law was misfeasance, not nonfeasance). These inconsistencies
are problematic when analyzing tort liability. Through sovereign immunity, “absent an express statutory duty [and] voluntary exercise of . . . authority,” governmental entities are
generally not liable for nonfeasance. Singleton v. City of Hamilton, 515 N.E.2d 8 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1986); see also James Fleming, Jr., Tort Liability of Government Units and Their Officers, 22
U. CHI. L. REV. 610, 622 (1955).
82.
As Justice Harlan dissents in Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891), citing commentary from English common law related to the liability of corporate officers for breaches
of trust: “[i]n this respect they may be guilty of acts of commission or omission, of malfeasance or non-feasance.” Id. at 172. Disagreements among courts related to these terms have
led some legal theorists to claim distinctions are “hopeless.” Paul T. Wangerin, Actions and
Remedies Against Government Units and Public Officers for Nonfeasance, 11 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 101,
102 (1979).
83.
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 44 (1953) (“To impose liability for the alleged nonfeasance of the Coast Guard would be like holding the United States liable in tort
for failure to impose a quarantine for, let us say, an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease.”).
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84

child abuse. In a forceful dissent, Justice Brennan argues that
precedent suggests a governmental entity “may be found complicit
in an injury even if it did not create the situation that caused the
85
harm.” As he acknowledges in his majority opinion in Owen v. City
of Independence (1980), liability is vital in “vindicating cherished
constitutional guarantees,” especially “when the wrongdoer is the
institution that has been established to protect the very rights it has
86
transgressed.” By this logic, liability deters government malfeasance based on action or inaction.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL COHESION: IN APPLICATION
A primary objective underlying recognition of principles of constitutional cohesion is to better assess how legal challenges are, or
may be, used strategically to confront legal and policy approaches
threatening public health and safety. Can cohesive principles generate new strategies to counter or challenge an increasing array of
federal, state, and local laws supporting actions or omissions that
are antithetical to the public’s health?
Beyond theory, the promise of constitutional cohesion in practice
relates to greater stability to mitigate changing governmental relationships or significant affronts to individual rights that contravene
public health promotion. As Professor Rebecca Brown prognosticated in 1991, the intersection of structural principles of separation of powers and individual rights with due process brings “a welcome coherence to the law developing around the body of the
Constitution, and [helps] to ensure the future balance of govern87
ment powers in a changing nation.”
Such bold assurances presuppose that applications of constitutional cohesion are predictable and constant. In actuality, they fluctuate over time, along with pendulum-like shifts in understanding
and interpreting structural principles and individual rights. As Professor Wendy Parmet notes, for decades courts tended to discount
84.
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). Later, in
Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), the Court rejected application of property interests via due process to require county law officers to enforce a restraining order designed to
protect a woman and her children from an abusive spouse/father.
85.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 207. Consistent with Justice Brennan’s view, one commentator
suggests governing bodies should be liable for actions or omissions, irrespective of categorization, that “play[] a part in the creation or exacerbation of a social problem.” Jenna MacNaughton, Positive Rights in Constitutional Law: No Need to Graft, Best Not to Prune, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 750, 763 (2001).
86.
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (A municipality is not immune
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations based on a defense of good faith actions
by its law enforcement officers.).
87.
Brown, supra note 38, at 1516.
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rights-based arguments against state and local public health
measures. She concludes that individual due process, equal protection, and other rights must give way to structurally-based police
88
and parens patriae powers. Only later did affirmative interpretations of individual rights override core public health efforts to ad89
dress specific or general threats. On first glance, these developments simply illustrate how balancing public health and individual
interests might favor either the community or individuals. The re90
ality is, however, far more complex.
At the core of modern conflicts over public health services is the
extent to which structural- and rights-based violations are “mirror
91
images” within a cohesive constitutional framework. In several instances, structural- or rights-based principles may alternatively be
argued to advance public health objectives. In this sense, structural
impediments or rights infringements may be equally viable options
to challenge government laws and policies that inadequately promote the public’s health under three primary applications (see Figure 3): intervening rights, structural swords, and constitutional inferences. As explained below, the first two applications provide
clear opportunities for positive interventions but carry some risks
related to adverse outcomes. The latter application, constitutional
inferences, takes principles of constitutional cohesion beyond mere
practice and back to its roots in legal theory.

88.
Wendy E. Parmet et al., Individual Rights Versus the Public’s Health—100 Years After
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 652 (2005) (stating that vaccination laws, isolation, or quarantines imposed for communicable diseases and laws about reporting sexually
transmitted diseases rely on the state police power affirmed in Jacobson).
89.
Id.
90.
Professor Lawrence Gene Sager suggests that limitations of Supreme Court rightsbased jurisprudence are based in part on “institutional” constructs that curbed the Court’s
willingness or capacity to intervene.
[T]he important difference between a true constitutional conception and the judicially formulated construct is that the judicial construct may be truncated for
reasons which are based not upon analysis of the constitutional concept but upon
various concerns of the Court about its institutional role. These concerns operate
to produce some judicial constructs which are not at all exhaustive of the constitutional concepts they reflect. Thus, a federal judicial construct may not be a true
constitutional conception because it may not exhaust the concept from which it
derives . . . .
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1214–15 (1978).
91.
Varol, supra note 33, at 1004 (“[C]onstitutional structure affects individual liberty,
its mirror image has been left understudied. Scholars have largely assumed that individual
rights have little resemblance to constitutional structure.”).
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FIGURE 3. APPLICATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COHESION

A. Intervening Rights
Constitutional exercises of public health powers among all levels
of government must conform to structural foundations like federalism, separation of powers, sovereign powers, and preemption.
Adherence to structural norms, however, is not the only measure
to assess their constitutionality. When government uses structural
principles to infringe unnecessarily on individual rights, cohesive
arguments may follow. These arguments may be framed in the
context of “intervening rights” to counter governmental exercises
consistent with traditional structural norms.
One of the premier illustrations of the role of rights-based arguments to challenge core public health powers arose in Jacobson v.
92
Massachusetts. In 1905, the Supreme Court issues its seminal decision upholding a state-based exercise of police powers authorizing
Massachusetts’ localities to require adult vaccinations for smallpox.
Reverend Henning Jacobson challenges state and local vaccination
powers based largely on liberty norms via due process and equal
protection violations (since elements of the vaccine law did not
apply uniformly to adults and children). The Commonwealth of
Massachusetts argues vehemently against Jacobson’s rights-based
arguments under common public health powers. Yet, the Commonwealth also advances specific objections grounded in federalism and separation of powers that were heavily relied upon in Justice Harlan’s majority opinion.
In essence, Massachusetts asserts that deciding disputes over the
scope of public health powers is the province of sovereign states,
92.

197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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and not the federal Supreme Court. The premise resonates with
the Court. “The safety and the health of the people of Massachusetts are, in the first instance, for that commonwealth to guard and
protect. They are matters that do not ordinarily concern the na93
tional government.” The Commonwealth additionally purports
that to the extent judicial courts must respect the legislative judgments of state and local governments, the Supreme Court is not
well-positioned to assess a locality’s implementation of, or basis for,
a vaccination law. Again, the Court acquiesces: “[T]he court would
usurp the functions of another branch of government if it adjudged, as matter of law, that the mode adopted under the sanction of the state, to protect the people at large was arbitrary, and
94
not justified by the necessities of the case.” Essentially, Massachusetts requests the Court to step away from the case entirely based
largely on structural foundations of federalism and separation of
powers. The Court declines, choosing instead to fully assess Jacobson’s rights-based arguments but ultimately finding in favor of the
95
Commonwealth.
To the degree that Jacobson loses his appeal centered on individual rights, the Court’s decision resounds the aforementioned,
longstanding judicial acceptance of the overriding power of state
96
and local public health efforts. However, Justice Harlan also clarifies how liberty principles do not succumb completely to public
97
health police powers. In so doing, he examines the interrelatedness of structural foundations and individual rights to craft reasonable and fair impositions on individual freedoms from vaccination
98
requirements justified by the need to protect the public’s health.
93.
Id. at 38.
94.
Id. at 28.
95.
Id. at 38 (“[W]e do not perceive that this legislation has invaded any right secured
by the Federal Constitution.”).
96.
See Parmet et al., supra note 88, at 329.
97.
Justice Harlan explains:
If there is any such power in the judiciary to review legislative action in respect of
a matter affecting the general welfare, it can only be when that which the legislature has done comes within the rule that, if a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no
real or substantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain,
palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the
courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31.
98.
HODGE, JR., NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 66, 85–95. Rights-based challenges to state
and local public health powers proliferate in modern day. In 2016, a gestational surrogate of
three babies challenged California public health officials (among others) in Cook v. Harding,
190 F. Supp. 3d 921 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.
Ct. 72 (2018). She alleged that a California statute protecting surrogacy contracts violated
her due process and equal protection rights. Reticent to invade issues of state law due to
federalism concerns, the court acknowledged the plaintiff’s constitutional assertions, but
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99

Decades later in Morrison v. Olson (1988), the Court examines a
100
provision of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 authorizing a
judiciary panel to appoint independent counsel to investigate specific crimes among high-ranking executive officials. Separation of
powers principles are clearly at play, but the Court focuses instead
101
on due process interests. To the extent the statute guarantees the
impartiality of decision-makers consistent with due process, it survives constitutional scrutiny. The next year the Court incorporates
102
comparable analyses in Mistretta v. United States (1989), approving
the structure of the U.S. Sentencing Commission.
Similar cross-cutting analyses are reflected increasingly in con103
temporary judicial challenges and decisions. In 2017, a Floridabased advocacy group claims that the state’s gun statutes preempt
104
multiple ordinances passed by the City of Tallahassee. The City
counters that state law and its accompanying penalties violate
structural principles of legislative immunity as well as freedoms of
105
106
speech. That same year in State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson,
joint arguments grounded in local home rule authority and munic107
ipal due process are presented in response to the Arizona State
legislature’s preemptive scheme to withhold all state funds from
localities whose public health (or other) laws conflict with state

ultimately deferred to ongoing state court proceedings. Id. In Baddock v. Baltimore Cty., 239
Md. App. 467 (2018), a hookah lounge operator challenged a county ordinance restricting
its hours of operation on grounds of equal protection and due process violations. The court
upheld the statute under a minimal rational basis review consistent with the public’s health.
Id.
99.
487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding that a federal act vesting the judiciary with the power
to appoint an inferior executive officer and prohibiting the Attorney General from removing the officer without good cause did not violate separation of powers principles).
100.
28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1988).
101.
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 125–26 (2000).
102.
488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that sentencing guidelines were constitutional,
amounting to neither excessive delegation of legislative power nor violation of separation of
powers principles).
103.
Professor David Orentlicher addresses the overlap of structural power and intervening rights in the context of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation of the
marketing of off-label drugs. David Orentlicher, Off-Label Drug Marketing, the First Amendment,
and Federalism, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89 (2016). By regulating off-label marketing, FDA
avoids federalism concerns arising from regulating the actual off-label use itself. Id. First
Amendment arguments centered on how the regulation of promotional speech is preferable
to “the federal government’s intrusion into the regulatory space of the states” is raised but
rejected. Id. at 102.
104.
Florida Carry, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 212 So. 3d 452 (Fla. 2017).
105.
Id. at 456 (“Appellees asserted that the penalty provisions provided in § 790.33 violated legislative immunity and the right of free expression.”). The case was dropped later
only because the ordinances were never actually enforced.
106.
242 Ariz. 588 (2017).
107.
Josh Bendor, Municipal Constitutional Rights: A New Approach, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 389 (2012) (explaining that municipalities have constitutional rights, such as the right
to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment takings clause when the federal government takes property).
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laws. Though ultimately rejected by the Arizona Supreme Court,
Tucson’s rights-based challenge (e.g., due process) to structurallybased strategies (e.g., preemption) illuminates the state’s suspect
legal tactics. Intervening rights arguments do not always succeed
but they represent a potent avenue for addressing potential vices.
B. Structural Swords
The flipside of intervening rights arguments is the use of structural arguments as a sword to limit unwarranted infringements of
individual rights contrary to the public’s health. Among other
claims, government impositions on individual rights may be circumvented via arguments that: (1) the wrong level of government
109
is acting (i.e., federalism); (2) the wrong division of government
110
is acting (e.g., separation of powers); (3) a lower government’s
111
effort is negated (i.e., preemption); (4) a government agency
lacks authority to implement the measure (e.g., non- delegation
112
doctrine, a subcomponent of separation of powers); or (5) insufficient evidence supports a proposed outcome under standards of
113
judicial review.
Judicial use of structural swords has its greatest application when
damaging public health policies are reversed or abandoned. In
114
2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13768 threaten-

108.
Brnovich, 242 Ariz. at 600 (holding that regulation of unclaimed firearms is within
the state’s “broad police powers,” which are not inherent in its municipalities).
109.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (finding under principles of federalism that Congress exceeded its commerce powers by statutorily making gun possession within a local school zone a federal criminal offense).
110.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 654 (1988).
111.
See, e.g., Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (preserving statebased failure to warn claims against cigarette manufacturing companies on grounds that
federal statutory law did not preempt state-based tort law claims. Preserving these claims
provided opportunities for consumer retribution and incentivized tobacco manufacturers to
companies to promote the public’s health).
112.
See, e.g., Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1987) (invalidating New York
State’s Public Health Council tobacco regulations as outside the Council’s delegated authority from the legislature); see also N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v.
N.Y. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12 (N.Y. App. Div. July 30, 2013) (striking down New York City’s proposed ban on large portion sizes of sugar sweetened beverages).
113.
In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46–48
(1983), the Court held that withdrawal of a passive restraint requirement in automobiles was
arbitrary and capricious, due in large part to a lack of evidence that costs of passive restraints
outweigh their safety benefits. Id. at 38. Consistent with principles of judicial review, an
agency “must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action” before withdrawing its standards. Id. at 43.
114.
Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (2017).
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115

ing to federally-defund “sanctuary cities.” It is a classic example of
governmental overreaching leading to instant judicial challenges
116
117
grounded in individual rights. In City of Chicago v. Sessions, however, a federal district court in Illinois rejects the Order as violative
118
of separation of powers principles. Congress had not authorized
the setting of special conditions for the receipt of all federal grants
119
as relied upon by the federal executive in invoking the Order.
Use of structural swords, however, can be double-edged akin to
120
protection and promotion of the public’s health. As part of its
121
“new federalism” jurisprudence in the 1990s, the Supreme Court
issued a series of decisions including structural arguments derailing legitimate public health or environmental objectives of Con122
gress. In Gregory v. Ashcroft (1991), the Court weighs a mandatory
retirement age law for Missouri state judges against alleged violations of principles of equal protection and the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In her majority opinion, however, Jus123
tice O’Connor looks alternatively to principles of federalism. She
concludes “congressional interference with [Missouri’s age limits]
would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state

115.
Suzannah Gonzales et al., U.S. Sides Against Trump in Fight Over Sanctuary Cities,
CHI. TRIBUNE (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigrationsanctuary/u-s-judge-sides-against-trump-in-fight-over-sanctuary-cities-idUSKCN1BQ2VL.
116.
See, e.g., City of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-CV-00574-WHO, 2017 WL 1459081, at
*24 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017) (Santa Clara and San Francisco were granted an injunction on
a finding that the Order was “unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”).
117.
No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 4081821, *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017), aff’d, 888 F.3d 272
(7th Cir. 2018).
118.
Id. at 280–90 (“[The district court] concluded that . . . the Attorney General lacks
the authority to impose [certain] Notice and Access conditions and that Chicago would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction” against the conditions.).
119.
Id. at 943. In addition, the Court found that the Attorney General lacked the statutory authority to impose compliance conditions.
120.
Public health is not the only legal area in which this observation is relevant. Professor Sager examines how the Supreme Court’s analyses of equal protection rights related to
state-based school financing laws in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973), were dictated in part by the Court’s concerns over “institutional” limits. These notably included the Court’s recognition that (1) assessing school finance and management
provisions “raise[es] very complicated and controversial questions, and an inexperienced
and inexpert Supreme Court ought not to impose [restraints] which curtail state experimentation” in violation of separation of powers and (2) “substantial federalism concerns are
threatened by the prospect of upsetting” state-based school finance provisions. See Sager,
supra note 90, at 1218.
121.
See generally James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 12
J.L. & HEALTH 309 (1998).
122.
501 U.S. 452, 453 (1991).
123.
Id. at 457–58.
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124

powers.” Despite individual rights concerns, mandatory retire125
ment ages for state judges is purely a matter of state concern.
126
In New York v. United States (1992), Justice O’Connor, again
127
writing for the majority, invalidates “take title” provisions of the
128
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. To
the extent states are presented with an option of taking ownership
of nuclear waste or held liable for its disposal, Congress unconstitutionally attempted to “commandeer the legislative processes of
the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a fed129
eral regulatory program.” Consistent with a cohesive view of
principles of federalism, she notes: “[T]he Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments, . . . for the protec130
tion of individuals.”
131
In United States v. Lopez (1995), a minor faced criminal charges
for possessing a gun at school in violation of the federal Gun Free
132
School Zones Act (GFSZA). His attorneys look beyond rightsbased arguments to craft a successful federalism challenge to Con133
gress’ commerce authority to implement the Act itself. Chief Justice Rehnquist agrees that Congress lacks commerce powers to penalize the mere possession, absent more, of a gun on or near
school grounds. “To uphold the Government’s contentions,” asserts the Court, “we would have to . . . convert congressional au-

124.
Id. at 460. Justice O’Connor noted that States’ authority to determine the qualifications of important government officials is at the heart of a representative government and
protected under the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 463.
125.
Id.
126.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
127.
The “take title” provisions of the Act required that any state that fails to provide for
disposal of low-level nuclear waste generated within its borders by January 1, 1996, must either take title to, or possession of, the waste, or else be liable for all damages incurred by an
in-state generator or owner of such waste. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1992).
128.
Id.
129.
New York, 505 U.S. at 202. As Justice O’Connor elucidates further:
States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States. State governments
are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal Government. The positions occupied by state officials appear nowhere on the Federal
Government’s most detailed organizational chart. The Constitution instead
“leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.”
citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961), reserved explicitly to the States
by the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 188.
130.
New York, 505 U.S. at 181. As Robert Schapiro concludes, “[F]ederalism protects
citizens, not states.” ROBERT SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION
OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 76 (2009).
131.
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
132.
Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990) [hereinafter GFSZA].
133.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[Congress shall have] power to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes.”).
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thority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of
134
the sort retained by the States.”
As a result of Supreme Court decisions in cases like Gregory, New
135
York, and Lopez, portions of federal acts designed to promote
public health and safety nationally are repudiated solely on structural grounds. Similar decisions abound among lower courts. In
136
ACORN v. Edwards (1996), for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals invalidates a provision of the federal Lead Contamination
137
Control Act of 1988, requiring states to create remedial programs
138
to limit lead in drinking fountains. Congress’ attempt to implement the program is an “unconstitutional intrusion upon the
139
States’ sovereign prerogative to legislate as it sees fit.”
In November 2018, a federal district court in Michigan ruled
that Congress lacked commerce authority to criminalize interstate
cases of female genital mutilation (FGM). In United States v. Na140
garwala, the court sees a disconnect between specific commercial
activity and the local practice of FGM under themes previously laid
141
out in Morrison. “[F]ederalism concerns,” suggests the court,

134.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68.
135.
After the Court’s decision in Lopez, Congress amended GFSZA to require that affected firearms must have “moved in or otherwise affect interstate or foreign commerce.”
GFSZA § 922(q)(2)(A) (1990). GFSZA declares,
Congress has the power, under the interstate commerce clause . . . to ensure the
safety of the nation’s schools by reasoning that crime involving firearms is a nationwide problem, firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce,
and violent crime in school zones results in a decline in the quality of education
which adversely impacts interstate commerce.
Id. at § 922(q)(1)(A)-(I). Correspondingly, most courts have upheld convictions under
GFSZA. See, e.g., United States v. Weekes, 224 F. App’x 200 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v.
Smith, (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Nieves-Castano, 480 F.3d 597 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 541 F.3d 19
(1st Cir. 2008). But see United States v. Tait, 202 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Haywood, 657 Fed. Appx. 97 (3rd Cir. 2016); United States v. Guzman-Montanez, 756 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 2014).
136.
81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996).
137.
H.R. REP. No. 1041, at 6–8 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3793, 3793–95.
138.
Section 300j-24(d) of the Lead Contamination Control Act “requires each State to
‘establish a program, consistent with this section,’ to assist local educational agencies,
schools, and day care centers in remedying potential lead contamination in their drinking
water systems.” ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1394.
139.
ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1394.
140.
350 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
141.
See e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610–13 (2000) (The Supreme
Court delineated four factors to assess the viability of congressional acts under the commerce power: (1) the economic nature of the activity; (2) a jurisdictional element limiting
the reach of the law to a discrete set of activities with explicit connections with, or effect on,
interstate commerce; (3) express congressional findings regarding the regulated activity’s
effects on interstate commerce; and (4) the link between the regulated activity and interstate commerce.). In Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp 3d, the court held that FGM was not a commercial activity because of a lack of an interstate market and that it was essentially a violent
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“deprive Congress of the power to enact [the statute prohibiting
142
FGM]” given an absence of proof of substantial effects on inter143
state commerce. In December 2018, federal district court Judge
144
145
Reed O’Connor invalidated the ACA in Texas v. United States.
When Congress zeroed out the penalty assessed on eligible persons
who did not acquire health insurance via the individual mandate
146
in 2017, the court concludes that the entire ACA is voided under
an obtuse interpretation of principles of severability embedded
within separation of powers.
In each of these cases, results inapposite to Congress’ laudable
public health objectives reflect the risks of advancing structural arguments. Structural principles may help stabilize government levels and branches, but not always lead to favorable public health
outcomes.
C. Constitutional Inferences
The prior two applications of constitutional cohesion reflect fairlysettled, albeit often under-utilized, principles of constitutional law.
Despite risks inherent in the utilization of these themes, the merits
of applied arguments grounded in intervening rights and structural swords are indubitable. Intervening rights principles illuminate
unconstitutional elements of government acts that may otherwise
be adjudged as lawful. Structural swords may derail governmental
interventions that may not fully rise to the level of rights infringements, but still reflect unconstitutional vices.
There are, however, additional opportunities to interject constitutional norms challenging existing laws or policies. A court may
identify that a specific act (or omission) negatively impacts the
public’s health, but fail to conclude that it impinges one’s rights
crime, which the Supreme Court has previously held to not be economic activity. See United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
142.
Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 618.
143.
The court determined there were no significant congressional findings or other
evidence of a substantial effect on interstate commerce despite Congress’ findings that the
practice of FGM (1) is carried out by members of certain cultural and religious groups; (2)
often results in physical and psychological health effects among affected women; (3) infringes on specific rights; (4) can be difficult for any single State or local jurisdiction to prohibit; and (5) can be prohibited without violating persons’ religious freedoms under the
First Amendment. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 629 n.8.
144.
42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
145.
No. 4:18-CV-00167-O (N. D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2018).
146.
Sarah Somers & Jane Perkins, Texas Court Decision on the Affordable Care Act: The Ruling and What to Expect, NAT’L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM (Dec. 17, 2018) https://healthlaw.org/
texas-court-decision-on-the-affordable-care-act-the-ruling-and-what-to-expect/; see also James
G. Hodge, Judicial Invalidation of the Affordable Care Act, JURIST (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2018/12/james-hodge-judge-invalid-aca/.
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under a prevailing balance test or other interpretation. Such an
outcome could easily be attributed to a consequence of constitutional balancing: sometimes an offending law or policy does not
sufficiently implicate structural or rights-based infringements.
However, it also may extend from a failure to properly recast a
constitutional issue in terms of an identifiable vice. The principle
of constitutional inferences suggests that vices may be inferred
from governmental violations.
Constitutional vices may arise even when clear breaches of specific, enumerated rights or aberrations of structural norms do not.
During the 1920s, the Supreme Court justified incorporating key
Bill of Rights principles to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment in part to counter known vices. In De Jonge v. State of Oregon
(1937), Chief Justice Hughes elucidates: “[E]xplicit mention [of
rights to assemble in the First Amendment] does not argue [for
its] exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied
without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions” (emphasis
148
added). Years later, in 1945, concurring Justice Jackson acknowledges inherent vices at stake in Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indi149
ans v. United States, denying Native Americans’ property rights to
150
reservation lands.
In 2015, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to
same-sex marriage under substantive due process in Obergefell v.
151
Hodges. Justice Kennedy equates vice determinations within a
framework of injustices:

147.
Many courts may be leery of arguments disguised as “vices” but actually grounded
in ethical or normative judgments. Samuel Enoch Stumpf, The Moral Element in Supreme Court
Decisions, 6 VAND. L. REV. 41, 41 (1952) (“[T]he past twenty years reveals a manful resistance
on the part of [Supreme Court] judges to intrude their moral and ethical judgments into
their decisions.”). In cases unrelated to constitutional questions, judicial efforts to correct
injustices may be expressed through proclaimed public policy exceptions to long-settled
doctrines. See generally G.N. Williams, Importance of Public Policy Considerations in Judicial Decision Making, 25 INT’L LEGAL PRAC. 134 (2000).
148.
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 53 (1947). The Court failed to incorporate all of the first eight constitutional amendments to the states, Justice Black’s dissent relied extensively on statements from Rep. John
Bingham, a primary framer of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. He justified the
amendment to thwart the “[m]any instances of State injustice and oppression [that had]
already occurred in the State legislation of this Union.” Id. at 107.
149.
Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 355 (1945)
(“The generation of Indians who suffered the privations, indignities, and brutalities of the
westward march of the whites have gone to the Happy Hunting Ground, and nothing that
we can do can square the account with them.”).
150.
Id. (“[J]udgment or no judgment—a moral obligation of a high order rests upon
this country to provide for decent shelter, clothing, education, and industrial advancement
of [Native Americans] . . . The Indian problem is essentially a sociological problem, not a
legal one.”).
151.
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015).
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The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our
own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill
of Rights . . . did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all its dimensions . . . . When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received
legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed (emphasis
152
added).
Generating new rights, in essence, begins with identification of “injustices” (or governmental vices) through new “insights.” It is the
153
Court’s unique role, in fact, its constitutional duty, to consistently
154
look for and clarify these vices even when the underlying issues
155
are politically dynamic. Still, ascertaining the scope and nature of
constitutional vices is complicated and controversial. Reasonable
minds differ on what actually constitutes a vice. Some may, for example, denote the allowance of rampant acts of gun violence nationally as a form of government oppression. Others insist that the
Second Amendment right to bear arms (which supports populations’ liberal access to guns) exists to deter government oppres156
sion. Somewhere between these views lies an appropriate legal
balance that respects Second Amendment rights and enhances
communal health pursuant to principles of constitutional cohesion.
Despite the complexities of ascertaining vices, whenever a constitutional vice can be tied to government action or inaction, concomitant remedies assuredly exist to address it. The notion that the
Constitution provides fixed provisions of unbending nature may be
the mantra of originalists, but it hardly befits the role of the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, to assess vices and ascribe protections. As Professor Cass Sunstein notes, “[c]onstitutional change
is often a product not of constitutional amendment, but of inter157
pretation, leading to new understandings of old provisions.” As
Justice Kennedy concludes in Obergefell, the Constitution is suffi-

152.
Id. at 2598.
153.
See id. (“The identification and protection of fundamental rights [are] an enduring
part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution . . . [that] has not been reduced to any
formula.”).
154.
As the Supreme Court denotes in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803), it is
“emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”
155.
See generally Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1263 (D. Or. 2016); see
infra discussion Part IV A.
156.
Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1052 (R.I. 2004) (Flanders, J., dissenting) (arguing
that an armed populace was needed to “provide a republican counterweight to the omnipresent threat that government rulers exercising arbitrary power would usurp the people’s
rights and liberties”).
157.
Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees, 56 SYR. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (citing David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996)).
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ciently flexible, to permit “future generations [to] protect . . . the
158
right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.”
III. AUXILIARY, CREATIVE, AND GHOST RIGHTING
At the crux of principles of constitutional cohesion is the premise
that constitutional remedies exist to counter known or identified
vices, specifically among governmental actors. These remedies may
be found within structural foundations or explicit enumerated
rights. Yet sometimes, as per the notion of constitutional inferences, the cure for a known vice may not be explicitly framed in
rights-based protections or structural principles. In such cases, it
may be easy to conclude there is no constitutional remedy for an
identified vice. This is simply untrue.
Constitutional interpretations in response to governmental actions or inactions implicating vices take many forms, most notably
framed in rights-based parlance. Long-standing Supreme Court jurisprudence reveals that not every right has to be specified consti159
tutionally to warrant protection. Unstated rights may flow from
new interpretations of express language in the Bill of Rights as well
160
as the structure of the Constitution itself. Some legal scholars as161
162
sert that the Ninth Amendment supports unenumerated rights
by clarifying how the limited provisions in the Bill of Rights did not
163
foreclose the existence of other rights. Professor Akhil Reed Amar posits that the judiciary is poised via the Ninth Amendment to
158.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
159.
Sunstein, supra note 157, at 11.
160.
See Randy E. Barnett, Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 615, 628 (1991) (James Wilson has proclaimed that “[i]n all societies,
there are many powers and rights, which cannot be particularly enumerated.”).
161.
U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
162.
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 1, 3 (2006) (classifying multiple models for interpreting the purposes of the Ninth
Amendment and concluding that one, the individual natural rights model, “preserve[s] unenumerated individual rights”); see also Kurt Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331, 347, 362 (2004) (suggesting Barnett’s individual natural
rights interpretation could protect a “collective right of the people to state or local selfgovernment” under principles of federalism).
163.
See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 439 (1789). Concerning the proposition of the Bill
of Rights, Framer James Madison stated:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular
exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not
placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those rights
which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the
General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most
plausible arguments I have ever heard against the admission of a bill of rights into
this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against.
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consider unexpressed individual rights “that nevertheless might
164
deserve constitutional status.”
Under these and other perspectives examined below, new rights
may emerge (1) from cobbled interpretations of a penumbra of
rights (“auxiliary righting”); (2) expanded conceptions of existing
rights (“creative righting”); or (3) ethereal rights generated from
principles embedded within structural foundations or unstated
constitutional norms (“ghost righting”).
A. Auxiliary Righting
Constitutional textualists tend to look solely at the express lan165
guage of the Constitution to ascertain whether rights exist. However, Supreme Court jurisprudence is not limited to the actual,
specific text or originalist notions of the Framers’ intended mean166
ing. To the extent the Constitution is a living document capable
of modern application, the Court has consistently demonstrated a
167
willingness to view its protections beyond antiquated notions.
A clear example of constitutional flexibility relates to the Court’s
expansive view of rights of privacy. Modern privacy rights evolved
from initial conceptions dating back to the late nineteenth centu168
ry, but it was not until the mid-1960s that the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged a standalone “right to privacy.” In Griswold v.
169
Connecticut (1965), the Court strikes down a state law prohibiting
birth control. As Justice Douglas explains for the majority, privacy
rights are not explicitly framed in the Constitution. Rather, they
are undergirded via the First, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Collectively, these provisions provide “pe170
numbras” from which “zones of privacy” originate. In this way,
the Court examines the Constitution as a cohesive whole instead of
a mere assemblage of principles to craft auxiliary privacy rights that
were otherwise unstated textually. Modern privacy rights buttress

164.
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 328 (2005). Professor
Amar prompts judges to “look for rights that the people themselves have truly embraced—
in the great mass of state constitutions, perhaps, or in widely celebrated lived traditions, or
in broadly inclusive political reform movements.” Id. at 329.
165.
See Victoria Nourse, Two Kinds of Plain Meaning, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 997, 1003
(2011).
166.
See Michael A. Livermore & Theodore D. Rave, Conversation, Representation, and Allocation: Justice Breyer’s Active Liberty, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1505, 1508 (2006).
167.
Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1054 (1981).
168.
See S. D. Warren & L. D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
169.
381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
170.
Id. at 484.
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171

reproductive and other freedoms with significant corollary public
health benefits.
One of Americans’ cherished freedoms is their claim of a right
172
to citizenship pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The
amendment’s text, however, does not speak to one’s right to remain a citizen. In 1958, the Court holds that federal authority to
revoke citizenship resides in Congress’ implied power to regulate
173
174
foreign affairs. In Afroyim v. Rusk (1967), it reverses course.
Writing for the majority, Justice Black finds that the Constitution
“grants Congress no express power to strip people of their citizen175
ship.” Citizenry is so fundamental to societal structure that the
Fourteenth Amendment must be interpreted to protect one’s right
176
to be free from involuntary expatriation. This auxiliary right arising in Afroyim cannot be “shifted, canceled, or diluted at the will of
the Federal Government, the States, or any other governmental
177
unit.”
178
In a remarkable modern case, Juliana v. United States (2016),
climate activists sue multiple federal entities during President
179
Obama’s administration in a federal district court in Oregon.
They raise several claims, including substantive due process viola180
tions regarding federal failures to address climate change. Feder-

171.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
172.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside.”).
173.
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 62 (1958) (affirming Congress’ right to revoke the
petitioner’s citizenship after he voted in a foreign election).
174.
387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (striking down a federal statute enabling revocation of
citizenship based on a person’s actions to vote in another country’s legislative body).
175.
Id. at 257, 258–62 (discussing the legislative history of expatriation, including a
proposed bill to require the consent of the federal government before an individual can
voluntarily renounce his or her citizenship).
176.
Id. at 268.
177.
Id. at 262.
178.
217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016). In 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the U.S. petition for a writ of mandamus. After multiple procedural maneuvers, including two Supreme Court orders, the case is currently stayed pending a decision by
the Ninth Circuit.
179.
See, e.g., Steve Kroft, The Climate Change Lawsuit that Could Stop the U.S. Government
from Supporting Fossil Fuels, CBS NEWS (Mar. 3, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
juliana-versus-united-states-the-climate-change-lawsuit-that-could-stop-the-u-s-governmentfrom-supporting-fossil-fuels-60-minutes/.
180.
Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1233. The constitutionally-framed arguments raised by
the plaintiffs make more sense in part due to the 2011 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011), denying state-based claims
for damages related to greenhouse gas emissions as violations of federal public nuisance law.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, determined that Congress’ passage of multiple
federal laws empowering the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate greenhouse gases effectively circumvented any nuisance claim even if the EPA failed to properly
or fully regulate. Id. at 420–29.

FALL 2019]

203

The Right to Public Health
181

al defendants challenge plaintiffs’ standing and question the
court’s capacity to adjudicate non-justiciable political questions
182
under principles of separations of powers. Recognizing the case
183
is no “ordinary lawsuit,” Judge Aiken disagrees with the federal
defendants, systematically striking down their structural argu184
ments. She then sweeps aside the government’s contention that
it need only demonstrate a minimal rationale for its efforts concerning climate change under substantive due process.
In so doing, Judge Aiken paves the way for a unique and aggressive interpretation of plaintiffs’ liberty interests. Citing Supreme
Court precedents, the court clarifies that fundamental liberty interests include enumerated rights as well as rights (1) “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” or (2) “fundamental
185
to our scheme of ordered liberty[.]” While the Supreme Court is
186
leery of expansive interpretations of liberty interests, recognition
187
of new fundamental rights is not “out of bounds.” “[I] have no
doubt,” concludes Judge Aiken, “that the right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and ordered socie188
ty.” Consistent with Supreme Court reasoning in Obergefell v.
181.
The defendants’ claim that the U.S. could not be sued for failure to act was rejected
by the court. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (finding that the Commonwealth
had standing to challenge the EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions). When
the federal government exercises its powers, states may sue to compel it to act in accordance
with that power where state’s public health, environmental, or other interests are at risk. Id.
182.
Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1235.
183.
Id. at 1234. (“[T]his lawsuit is not about proving that climate change is happening
or that human activity is driving it . . . those facts are undisputed. The questions before the
Court are whether defendants are responsible for some of the harm caused by climate
change, whether plaintiffs may challenge defendants’ climate change policy in court, and
whether this Court can direct defendants to change their policy without running afoul of
the separation of powers doctrine.”).
184.
Id. at 1251. As the court explicates, separation of powers principles may limit its jurisdiction outside actual cases or controversies; “federal courts retain broad authority ‘to
fashion practical remedies when confronted with complex and intractable constitutional
violations.’” Id. at 1242–43 (citing Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 526 (2011)).
185.
Id. at 1249 (citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)) (internal
citations, quotations, and emphasis omitted).
186.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
187.
Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249 (emphasis added). Assessing whether a right is fundamental requires courts to engage in “reasoned judgment,” keeping in mind that
“[h]istory and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.” See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
188.
Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250 (emphasis added). Judge Aiken compares her crafting of this specific right akin to the Supreme Court’s elucidation of a right to same-sex marriage from substantive due process principles in Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. “Just as marriage
is the ‘foundation of the family,’ a stable climate system is quite literally the foundation ‘of
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.’” Juliana, 217 F.
Supp. 3d at 1250–51 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)); cf. Minors Oposa
v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Envt’l & Nat. Res., G.R. No. 101083, 33 I.L.M. 173, 187–88 (S.C., July
30, 1993) (Phil.) (stating that without “a balanced and healthful ecology,” future generations “stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life”).
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189

Hodges, she views a stable climate system as essential to exercising
190
other rights to life, liberty, and property. Failing to assure it,
whether via direct action or omission, infringes plaintiffs’ funda191
mental rights under substantive due process.
The bold illustration of auxiliary righting in Juliana is potentially
short-lived. The federal government has appealed the decision
multiple times to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. Both courts have allowed the trial court to proceed
while signaling incongruities with its determinations. Regardless of
its fate, the decision provides key insights for other activist courts
seeking to identify constitutional vices with supporting rights to
192
address them.
B. Creative Righting
Through auxiliary righting, courts look beyond unstated principles to craft individual rights via enhanced interpretations emanating from constitutional foundations. In other cases, courts rely on
creative assessments of explicit rights-based language. In either instance, the result is the same: new rights conceptions are born
from jurists wielding constitutional principles toward a specific
end.
“Creative righting” can behoove the public’s health. For example, the Supreme Court has increasingly culled from the prohibitive language of the Eighth Amendment an affirmative obligation
193
to protect prisoners’ health. In Helling v. McKinney (1993), it

189.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
190.
Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250.
191.
Id. at 1251 (citing Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 709 (9th Cir.
1997) (keeping its analyses within what has been labeled the “danger creation” exception to
the Supreme Court’s determination in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), that government generally is not required to act for one’s benefit
under the liberty principle, and pursuant to this exception, government may plausibly be
required to act when it “places a person in peril in deliberate indifference to their safety”).
In Juliana, the alleged peril is the government’s failure to limit third-party CO2 emissions
contributing to climate change and negative health and environmental effects. For the
claim to prevail, plaintiffs would have to demonstrate at trial that “(1) the government’s acts
created the danger to the plaintiff; (2) the government knew its acts caused that danger;
and (3) the government with deliberate indifference failed to act to prevent the alleged
harm.” Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1252.
192.
See infra text accompanying note 322; see also Alfred T. Goodwin, A Wake-Up Call for
Judges, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 785, 785–86, 788 (2015) (“The third branch can, and should, take
another long and careful look at the barriers to litigation created by modern doctrines of
subject-matter jurisdiction and deference to the legislative and administrative branches of
government.”).
193.
509 U.S. 25, 25, 31 (1993) (addressing whether a viable Eighth Amendment claim
exists “by alleging that his compelled exposure to [environmental tobacco smoke] poses an
unreasonable risk to his health”).
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rules that involuntary exposure to second-hand smoke can form
the basis of an Eighth Amendment injunction. While such protections historically apply to more egregious government conduct
194
(e.g., torture), Helling extends them to obviate mere risks of inju195
196
ry to prisoners. Using a similar analysis in Brown v. Plata (2011),
the Court limits prison overcrowding in California on grounds of
inadequate access to mental health care. “A prison that deprives
prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical care,”
notes the Court, “is incompatible with the concept of human dig197
nity and has no place in civilized society.”
198
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health (1990), a
fundamental right to refuse medical treatment is deduced from
substantive due process via the Fourteenth Amendment. The
guardians of a patient in a vegetative state fought to exercise her
199
wish to terminate artificial hydration and nutrition. Under due
process, the Court infers a “constitutionally protected liberty inter200
est in refusing unwanted medical treatment.” Justice Antonin
Scalia, in concurrence, belies the Court’s apparent departure from
201
the Constitution’s text and purpose.
Unfortunately, public health promotion can also be lost in constitutional translations. In 2008, the Supreme Court’s interpreta202
tion of the right to bear arms in District of Columbia v. Heller led to
203
a substantial reassessment of the Second Amendment. Justice
Scalia bifurcates the Amendment’s (1) prefatory clause (“A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the Security of a free State”)
from the (2) operative clause (“the right of the people to keep and
bear arms, shall not be infringed”). Dismissing the former clause as
204
nonessential despite long-standing established precedent, Justice
194.
See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (incorporating the Eighth Amendment against the state of California and all other states as a result); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99
U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (“[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in
the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by” the Eighth Amendment.).
195.
Helling, 509 U.S. at 35. In dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the Court’s
expansion of Eighth Amendment’s protections went “beyond all bounds of history and
precedent.” Id. at 37 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
196.
563 U.S. 493, 510–11 (2011).
197.
Id. at 511.
198.
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
199.
Id. at 278.
200.
Id.
201.
“The text of the Due Process Clause does not protect individuals against deprivations of liberty simpliciter. It protects them against deprivations of liberty ‘without due process of law.’” Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202.
554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008).
203.
U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of
a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”).
204.
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65–66 (1980) (holding that a federal statute
prohibiting a felon from owning a firearm “is consonant with the concept of equal protection embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment”); United States v. Miller,
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Scalia argues that the operative language creates a right to selfdefense at home with a lawful firearm. In dissent, Justice Stevens
alleges that the “Court appear[s] to have fashioned [its interpreta205
tion] out of whole cloth.”
The Court’s re-envisioning of Second Amendment language reflects a modern example of creative righting that drew immediate
criticism with lasting repercussions on public health and safety.
Countless gun laws and policies survive public health challenges
due, in part, to the Court’s aggressive assessment of individual
206
rights to bear arms. Tens of thousands of Americans are injured
207
or killed needlessly due to lax gun control measures. In 2018, retired Justice Stevens called for a complete repeal of the Second
Amendment given the horrendous escalation of gun-related deaths
208
nationally. Early in 2019, the Court agreed via a slim 5-4 vote to
hear oral arguments in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v.
City of New York in which gun rights proponents challenge a restric209
tive local handgun possession ordinance. Public health officials
are already prognosticating the Court’s further expansion of Sec210
ond Amendment rights in its forthcoming decision.
C. Ghost Righting
As ready examples of constitutional inferences, auxiliary or creative righting involve interpretive judicial exercises based on existing Constitutional provisions. “Ghost righting,” however, is distinct.
307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (stating that the Court “cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear” a “shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen
inches in length”).
205.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206.
See Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, Firearms & Health: The Right to be Armed with
Accurate Information About the Second Amendment, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1773, 1773; Daniel W.
Webster et al., Flawed Gun Policy Research Could Endanger Public Safety, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
918 (1997).
207.
Guns in the US: The Statistics Behind the Violence, BBC NEWS (Jan. 5, 2016)
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34996604; Michelle Samuels, Black American
Life Expectancy Decreasing Disproportionately Due to Firearms, B.U. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH
(Dec. 4, 2018) https://www.bu.edu/sph/2018/12/04/gun-deaths-have-taken-2-5-years-offus-life-expectancy/.
208.
John Paul Stevens, Repeal the Second Amendment,” N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/opinion/john-paul-stevens-repeal-secondamendment.html.
209.
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that a gun licensing scheme limiting the transportation of a firearm from the licensed
address only “to and from an authorized small arms range/shooting club, unloaded, in a
locked container, the ammunition to be carried separately” did not violate the Second
Amendment), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 939 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2019) (No. 18-280).
210.
Adam Liptak, Justices Accept New York Case on Gun Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2019, at
A1 (“It could be a landmark case with major implications for gun policy”) (quoting gun control advocate Adam Winkler).
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It refers to the capacity of courts to recognize or create core principles that neither the structure nor language of the Constitution
explicitly convey or denote. Ghost righting seems mysterious, even
shadowy. However, its foundations under advanced interpretations
of constitutional norms are clearly seen related to expressed rights
to education and travel.
In 1971, a federal district court in Massachusetts recognizes a
constitutional right to education without specifying any underlying
211
authority. A year later, another federal district court in New
Hampshire acknowledges a right to public school education de212
spite the absence of constitutional textual support. “[N]o authority was needed,” held the court, “for the fundamental American
principle that a public school education through high school is a
213
basic right of all citizens.” In San Antonio Independent School District
214
v. Rodriguez (1973), the Supreme Court states, in dicta, that there
215
is no explicit or implicit constitutional right to education. Thirteen years later, however, in Papasan v. Allain (1986), the Court
clarifies that whether a minimally adequate education is a funda216
mental right is “not yet definitively settled.” Consequently, lower
court cases holding that education is a fundamental right remain
valid.
Modern scholars concur. Professor Susan Bitensky argues that
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Rodriguez, does not
“adopt a rigid and absolutist position against the right [to educa217
tion].” Professor Derek Black argues for recognition of a collec211.
Ordway v. Hargaves, 323 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (D. Mass. 1971) (holding that a public
school must reinstate a student given a failure by the school to demonstrate direct harms to
the student or others). The court finds it is “beyond argument that the right to receive a
public school education is a basic personal right or liberty.” Id.
212.
Cook v. Edwards, 341 F. Supp. 307, 310–11 (D.N.H.1972) (holding a student’s indefinite expulsion from school implicated substantive due process because it could end the
plaintiff’s scholastic career). The identified constitutional vice which the court was arguably
attempting to address in its pronouncement relates most closely to oppression. In Cook,
plaintiff alleges the defendant school board acted in excess of school district regulations
regarding appropriate grounds and process for expulsion. Id.
213.
Id. at 310–11.
214.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
215.
Id. at 34–35 (“It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. . . . Education, of course, is
not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do
we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”). Based in part on guidance from
the Supreme Court, other lower courts have since disagreed with the findings in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. See infra Part IV.C.
216.
478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) (deciding whether a disparate public school funding
scheme unconstitutionally deprived children of a minimally adequate education). In Rodriguez, differences in public school funding resulted from “allowing local control over local
property tax funding of the public schools.” Id. at 266–67. In Papasan, such differences resulted from state decisions to allocate resources. Id.
217.
Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U.L. REV. 550, 567 (1992)
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tive constitutional right to education on historical bases as a means
218
to obviate state malfeasance. What prior courts adjudicated as a
fundamental right to education absent any explicit textual sources
exemplifies ghost righting.
The technique resurfaces in the Court’s long-standing and multi-faceted recognition of rights to travel. Like privacy or education
rights, nowhere in the language of the Constitution is there an explicit reference to rights to travel. Yet, in a series of cases, the
Court specifically recognizes travel rights to address governmental
infringements constituting malfeasance and other vices. In Aptheker
219
v. Secretary of State (1964) the Court invalidates a federal law bar220
ring members of communist organizations from using a passport.
It notes:
Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction,
and inside frontiers as well, [is] a part of our heritage.
Travel abroad, like travel within the country, . . . may be as
close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he
eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in
221
our scheme of values.
222

Two years later, in United States v. Guest (1966), the Supreme
Court acknowledges that the “freedom to travel throughout the
United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the
223
224
Constitution,” despite any specific identified textual support.
Instead, it relies on structural principles. State unification via the
Constitution, surmises the Court in Guest, is not possible absent a
225
right to travel.
(suggesting that the Court would only adjudge the existence of such a right if presented
with a case of a government that completely denied children access to an education).
218.
Although Professor Black acknowledges education rights are not expressly guaranteed via the Constitution, he asserts that states attending the Constitutional Convention
were required to add an education mandate to their state constitutions. Education, he posits, is fundamental to being a citizen and must not be infringed by state malfeasance. See
Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 STAN. L. REV. 735,
743, 745–46 (2018) (“[O]ne of the points of ensuring education as a basic right of citizenship was to place it beyond manipulation. Failure to do so would jeopardize the republican
form of government itself.”). Unlike prior decisions, he would tie a right to education as an
auxiliary to Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of citizenship. Id. at 744.
219.
378 U.S. 500 (1964).
220.
See id. at 503–05 (holding unconstitutional § 6 of the Subversive Activities Control
Act, making it a felony for a member of a Communist organization to apply for or use a
passport).
221.
Id. at 505–06 (citation omitted).
222.
383 U.S. 745 (1966).
223.
Id. at 758.
224.
See id. at 759. The Court briefly considers whether a right to travel flows from the
Commerce Clause, but ultimately rejects this exploration.
225.
See id. at 757.
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Two decades later, Justice Brennan denotes how the “elusive”
right to travel is historically inferred from “the federal structure of
226
government adopted by our Constitution.” Even as the Court later connects some aspects of the right to travel to specific constitutional provisions, it reaffirms that at least one element of the right
exists despite any textual support. In Saenz v. Roe (1999), it examines three components of the right to travel, only two of which
227
have textual sources. First, U.S. citizens have a right “to be treated as a welcome visitor . . . when temporarily present” in another
state under Article IV’s privileges and immunities clause. Second,
they have a right to be treated like other citizens who are permanent state residents pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause.
In Saenz, the Court also finds that citizens have rights to ingress
and egress across state borders. As in prior decisions, however, it
228
cannot specify a constitutional source for this component. Borrowing language from earlier jurisprudence, the Court concludes
that such rights “may simply have been ‘conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Con229
stitution created.’” In essence, the right to ingress and egress ex230
ists despite a complete lack of direct constitutional support.
The Court’s evolving analysis regarding the scope of a right to
travel evinces a clear case of ghost righting. Unwritten rights on an
individualized level arise from the very structure of the Constitu226.
Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 (1986) (emphasis added). As in
Guest, the Court again considered and rejected enshrining the right specifically in the commerce clause (as well as in the Fourteenth Amendment). Id. at 902–03. As Justice Brennan
opined, “the important role that [the right to travel] has played in transforming many States
into a single Nation” precluded any need to textually base it. Id. at 902.
227.
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500–03 (1999) (holding that the right to travel “protects
the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated
as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second
State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be
treated like other citizens of that State”).
228.
Id. at 498; see also Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 902 (emphasis added).
229.
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966)). An
alternative view related to the Court’s observation in this regard relates to its recognition
that the right to ingress and egress extends from the prior structural relationship between
the states that preceded constitutional framing. To this end, the right to ingress and egress
is not so much about its “ghostly” presence within the Constitution, but the Court’s acknowledgment it preceded the development of the Constitution entirely. Even if this view is
partially true, the Court attributes the right to constitutional structural facets.
230.
See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (“[Walking,
strolling, and wandering] are historically part of the amenities of life as we have known
them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten
amenities have been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence
and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity.”); see also Timothy Baldwin, The Constitutional
Right to Travel: Are Some Forms of Transportation More Equal Than Others?, 1 NW. J.L. & SOC.
POL. 213, 254 (2006) (“Justice Douglas sought to protect the act of walking, even if it is not
mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights.”) (citation omitted).
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tion with manifold public health ramifications. Recognition of
constitutional rights to ingress and egress necessitate balancing individual and communal interests across diverse policies related to
sex offender registries, juvenile curfews, drug and gun free exclu231
sion zones, and emergency evacuations/relocations. The Court
has shown particular disdain for state-based residency requirements to acquire health or other benefits. In Shapiro v. Thompson
232
(1969), it disfavors a one-year residency requirement for persons
233
in the District of Columbia to become welfare eligible. Later, in
234
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County (1974), it strikes down an Arizona statute mandating a one-year residency to garner non235
emergency medical care at government’s expense.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PUBLIC HEALTH
Theoretic and applied principles of constitutional cohesion broaden the range of arguments to address identifiable vices of government which the Constitution is designed to obviate or remedy. As
Professor Sunstein recognizes, “the American Constitution has
come to be interpreted in ways that depart from its original mean236
ing.” In essence, “[t]he Constitution means what the Supreme
237
Court says that it means.” Under this view, cohesive principles are
significantly illustrated in multiple contexts. Infringements of
rights may intervene to derail improper exercises of public health
powers. Structural arguments may slice through misplaced or aggressive use of powers to promote communal health. Constitutionally-grounded positive and negative rights may be inferred from
the identification of governmental vices. Auxiliary or creative right231.
See generally Rebecca Eaton, Escape Denied: The Gretna Bridge and the Government’s
Armed Blockade in the Wake of Katrina, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 127 (2006); Larry E. Gee,
Federalism Revisited: The Supreme Court Resurrects the Notion of Enumerated Powers by Limiting Congress’s Attempt to Federalize Crime, 27 ST. MARY’S L.J. 151, 182 (1995); Kathryn E. Wilhelm, Freedom of Movement at a Standstill? Toward the Establishment of a Fundamental Right to Intrastate
Travel, 90 B.U.L. REV. 2461 (2010).
232.
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
233.
See id. at 642 (“[The] Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits Congress from denying public assistance to poor persons otherwise eligible solely on the ground
that they have not been residents of the District of Columbia for one year at the time their
applications are filed.”).
234.
415 U.S. 250 (1974).
235.
See id. at 251, 253 (upholding the right to travel, in addition to guarding against
government malfeasance, the Court sympathized with the plight of an impaired indigent
needing access to medical care).
236.
Sunstein, supra note 157, at 11. “I have emphasized that the meaning of the American Constitution changes because of new interpretations. If the Constitution meant, in all
respects, what it originally meant, American constitutional rights would be thin indeed.” Id.
at 19.
237.
Id. at 5.
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ing presents novel approaches to generate (or limit) rights-based
objections to substantial legal threats to public health.
The ethereal concept of ghost righting, however, manifests
something more. Though its applications are few, it provides a
route for addressing governmental vices (oppression, overreaching, tyranny, malfeasance) captured in the spirit of the Constitu238
tion, but not necessarily its text. At a minimum, ghost righting
provides a way for the Court to justify its assessments of inherent
rights untethered to textual guideposts. Most rights are enumerated or derived from penumbras of various rights fashioned by the
239
Court based on the Framers’ perceptions or its own volition. Yet,
some select rights are “conceived” solely because they are a “necessary concomitant” of the principles for which the Constitution
240
stands. And, like enumerated, auxiliary, or creative rights, ghost
rights carry an imprimatur of constitutional weight, meaning, and
241
enforcement.
At its apex, ghost righting may help usher in a new constitutional right to public health. Judicial recognition of this right, however,
faces considerable challenges. Exploration of the possible dimensions of the right begins with a recognition of (1) its legal shadows
already entrenched in Supreme Court parlance; (2) “rights to
health” principles enveloped in human rights, foreign and domestic constitutions, and other laws; and (3) opposition to navigating
new, unenumerated rights through courts traditionally reluctant to
242
recognize them. For a pathway to emerge, the right to public
health must be couched narrowly on assuring uniform protections

238.
See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
299 (1998) (“If rights can be unenumerated, is it possible to imagine entire constitutional
amendments that are unwritten?”).
239.
See Sunstein, supra note 157, at 15.
240.
See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999).
241.
Professor Sager argues that just because a specific right may not be recognized fully,
or “underenforced” as he describes it, does not mean it lacks constitutional support. The
Supreme Court may lack the fortitude to have carved out a specific constitutional requirement based on institutional limitations, but government actors may still observe it. As he
notes “government officials have a legal obligation to obey an underenforced constitutional
norm which extends beyond its interpretation by the federal judiciary to the full dimensions
of the concept which the norm embodies.” This may require “governmental officials to fashion their own conceptions of these norms and measure their conduct by reference to these
conceptions.” Sager, supra note 90, at 1227.
242.
Professor Sunstein attributes this failure in part to specific Justices appointed to the
Court during an era of conservatism that militated against expansion of rights consistent
with social and economic guarantees. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 157, at 5 (“[W]ith a
modest shift in personnel, the Constitution would have been understood to create social
and economic rights of the sort recognized in many modern constitutions.”). Sunstein ultimately concludes “that judicial interpretation of the law, including the Constitution, has a
great deal to do with the political commitments of the judges. The realist explanation stresses that American constitutional law is, to a considerable degree, a form of common law,
based on analogical reasoning.” Id. at 19–20.
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of basic public health services without the constant specter of legislative or executive diminution.
A. Shadows of the Right
Unlike citizens of industrialized nations that long ago embraced
243
universal health care, most Americans do not enjoy access to
basic health services via governmental duties. Some Americans,
however, do have a legitimate constitutional claim to these services.
The shadow of a ghost right to public health is cast in the Court’s
recognition of governmental obligations to protect the health of
specific populations, particularly prisoners and other wards of the
state. Denying medical services to prisoners is an affront to human
244
245
dignity in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Consistent with
substantive liberty interests, government must also provide appropriate medical care for persons involuntarily committed or con246
fined via quarantine, isolation, or for mental health purposes.
The Court, however, historically refuses to interpret the Constitution as including anything approaching a positive right to health
for all. In the aforementioned decision, Memorial Hospital v. Mari247
copa County (1974), it identifies health care as a “basic necessity of
248
249
life,” but clarifies three years later in Maher v. Roe (1977) that
“[t]he Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay” for
250
indigent medical expenses. Subsequently, the Court finds that
due process confers no specific rights to governmental aid for af251
252
fected individuals or impacted third parties. Principles of equal
protection support nondiscriminatory access to governmental
243.
See, e.g., LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 263 (2014) (noting that
Chile’s 1925 constitution included a right to health).
244.
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011) (holding that prison overcrowding leading
to improper mental health care is a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
245.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976) (“Deliberate indifference by prison personnel to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
contravening the Eighth Amendment.”).
246.
Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 314–25 (1982) (holding the Fourteenth
Amendment ensures reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and such minimally adequate training as reasonably might be required
by these interests).
247.
415 U.S. 250, 269–70 (1974) (striking down an Arizona state law requiring residency status for access to publicly-funded medical care as a right to travel violation); see discussion supra Part III.C.
248.
Id. at 259.
249.
432 U.S. 464, 469–80 (1977) (finding that the Equal Protection Clause did not require a state to pay Medicaid expenses incident to nontherapeutic abortions for indigent
women simply because it had made a policy choice to pay expenses incident to childbirth).
250.
Id. at 469.
251.
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty., Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
252.
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).
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253

medical services, but do not actually require government to fund
254
services in the first place. Absent recognition of an affirmative
right to health, courts have allowed government to deny access to
255
certain medical treatments and reject claims against parties alleged to have committed human rights abuses (including viola256
tions of rights to health) abroad.
Given the jurisprudential black hole regarding access to health
257
services for all Americans, proposals have arisen for federal con258
stitutional or congressional recognition of globally-developed
259
concepts on the “right to health.” In his State of the Union address on January 11, 1944, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
listed within his prospective Second Bill of Rights “[t]he right to
adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy
260
good health. His vision has never been realized domestically, but
multiple other countries explicitly provide for a right to health in261
clusive of basic public health services and medical care. Varying
253.
See Tom Stacy, The Courts, the Constitution, and a Just Distribution of Health Care, 3 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 83 (1993).
254.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 n.20 (1980) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 469 (1977)) (“The Constitution imposes no obligation on the [government] to pay the
pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical
expenses of indigents.”)).
255.
In Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007), the court held that terminally ill persons have no constitutional right to
acquire drugs not yet fully approved by FDA. In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), the Supreme Court denied access to medicinal cannabis to patients seeking it under California
state law as the drug remains unlawful via the federal Controlled Substances Act.
256.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 118, 124 (2013). In 2018, the Court
denied access to courts for similar suits against foreign corporations. See Jesner v. Arab Bank,
PLC, 200 L. Ed. 2d 612, 632, 636 (2018).
257.
See, e.g., Kenneth R. Wing, The Right to Health Care in the United States, 2 ANNALS OF
HEALTH L. 161, 161 (1993) (“There is nothing that can be characterized . . . as a constitutional right to health care in the United States. The federal Constitution does not require
any level of government to provide for or maintain the health of the population as a whole
or any portion of it; there are a few circumstances under which an individual can make a
constitutionally-based claim for a health or medical benefit, but these circumstances are rare
and the use of the term ‘right to health care’ in reference to them would be both misleading
and inappropriate.”).
258.
See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 30, 109th Cong. (2005).
259.
Gostin, supra note 24; Sunstein, supra note 157, at 1–2.
260.
See Sunstein, supra note 157, at 2 (citing President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to
Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 1944) in 13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES
OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 40–42 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950)).
261.
Many of these constitutional provisions are based on similar concepts within the
Universal Declaration for Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. UDHR Article 25 explicitly proclaims that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. Id. at 76. Additional human rights norms resonate similar language and principles, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). See,
e.g., GOSTIN, supra note 243, at 68.
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rights to health have been recognized in over 130 constitutions or
262
human rights documents based on multiple human rights trea263
tises.
Several American states also acknowledge health rights in some
264
way through their constitutions. New York’s constitution provides
that “[t]he protection and promotion of the health of the inhabit265
ants of the state are matters of public concern.” Hawaii’s constitutional language is even stronger: “[t]he State shall provide for
266
the protection and promotion of the public health.” Though
purposeful, these provisions fall short of enunciating a clear right
267
to public health. Even though the New Jersey state constitution
prioritizes “the preservation of health,” the state’s highest court
observes that it “does not guarantee explicitly a fundamental right
268
to health.” Montana’s constitution conveys that “[a]ll persons . . .
have certain inalienable rights [including] . . . to . . . [seek]
269
their . . . health . . . in all lawful ways.” Montana’s Supreme Court,
however, refuses to interpret this language as sustaining an affirm270
ative, enforceable right to health.
Some advocates have unsuccessfully proposed state constitution271
al amendments to solidify positive rights to health care. Even
some local jurisdictions espouse the critical need for base levels of
public health and health services. In 2019, New York City Mayor
Bill de Blasio committed $100 million of local resources for medi262.
GOSTIN, supra note 243, at 263.
263.
Id. at 243–54 (describing UDHR, ICESCR, and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR)). Some countries’ constitutional provisions guarantee elements or determinants of health, such as Ecuador, where “water, food, education, sports,
work, and social security” are enumerated rights. Id. at 264. Other nations ensure a right to
all-encompassing, holistic health for all citizens. Kenya’s constitution provides a right “to the
highest attainable standard of health.” Id. The Dominican Republic includes a “comprehensive right to health.” Id. at 263.
264.
See, e.g., E. W. Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12(5) J.
CONST. L. 1335, 1347, 1406 (2010).
265.
N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 3.
266.
HAW. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
267.
Leonard, supra note 264, at 1348.
268.
N.J. CONST., art. 1, ¶ 1 (recognizing “certain natural and unalienable rights,” including “life and liberty . . . safety and happiness”); Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 638
A.2d 1260, 1269 (N.J. 1994).
269.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1972).
270.
See, e.g., Simms v. Mont. Eighteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 68 P.3d 678, 682 (Mont.
2003); see also Mich. Universal Health Care Action Network v. State, No. 261400, 2005 Mich.
App. LEXIS 2929, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2005) (rejecting imposing a duty on the
legislature to establish a plan for greater access to health services).
271.
See, e.g., Kathrin Rüegg, Embedding the Human Right to Health Care in U.S. State Constitutions, NAT’L ECON. & SOC. RTS INITIATIVE, (2009), https://www.nesri.org/sites/default/
files/Constitutional_amendment_report.pdf. The effects of these constitutional platitudes
on public health promotion are not well known; one 2015 study links stronger state right to
health provisions and subsequent decreases in infant mortality. Hiroaki Matsuura, State Constitutional Commitment to Health and Health Care and Population Health Outcomes: Evidence from
Historic US Data, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, e48, e53 (2015).
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cal care of undocumented persons and others unqualified for
272
health coverage. Still, a right to public health in America is more
mirage than reality.
B. Judicial Navigation
Neither shadows of health rights for specific populations nor aspirational rights language in presidential speeches or state constitutions leads to recognition of a fundamental right to public
health. This right must be generated at a higher level of constitutional parlance grounded in the judiciary’s unique capacity to craft
new rights to address known vices. Navigating this path is daunting.
The Supreme Court has long expressed a strong reluctance to recognize new constitutional norms for manifold reasons grounded in
legal theory, political science (notably among its conservative
members), and its own established limits. Accordingly, the Court
has expressed substantial concerns about actively expanding rights
or reading new obligations into the Constitution regardless of the
273
magnitude of interests at stake.
On January 9, 2019, for example, the Court heard oral argu274
ments in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt. An aggrieved
plaintiff sued California tax authorities in a Nevada state court. His
counsel argues that the Framers support his right to sue another
state. In oral arguments, Justice Sotomayor retorts, “[i]t’s nice that
[the Framers] felt that way, but what we know is that they didn’t
275
put it into the Constitution.” Constitutional text and its meaning
equally concern Justice Alito: “We are always very vigilant to read
276
things into the Constitution that can’t be found in the text.” Justice Kavanaugh characterizes the Constitution as a document of
277
“majestic specificity,” consistent with his views expressed before
278
his ascendancy to the Court in October 2018.
272.
J. David Goodman, Free Health Care for the Uninsured Under Mayor’s $100 Million Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2019, at A19.
273.
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973) (“[T]he
importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause.”).
274.
139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (presenting an opportunity for the Court to reconsider its
longstanding precedent allowing states to be sued by parties in courts of other states).
275.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485
(2019) (No. 17-1299), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1299; see also Adam Liptak, Nevada Man v. California, But in Which State’s Court?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2019, at A16.
276.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct.
1485 (2019) (No. 17-1299), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1299.
277.
Id. at 20.
278.
As the newest member of the Court, Justice Kavanaugh brings an understanding of
how structural principles protect individual rights. He states in a 2017 lecture to the American Enterprise Institute that “[t]he framers believed that in order to protect individual liber-
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Prior opinions reflect the Court’s circumspection over identify279
ing or crafting new fundamental rights, especially positive rights
280
necessitating government action. Concerning due process rights,
for example, Chief Justice Roberts opines how the Court has “consistently refused to allow litigants to convert the shield provided by
constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive entitle281
ments from the State.” In the Court’s wisdom, new rights should
282
be crafted via constitutional amendment or by Congress, and not
283
by activist jurists for several reasons:
ty, power should not be concentrated in one person or one institution.” Brett Kavanaugh,
From the Bench: The Constitutional Statesmanship of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, AM.
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, 1–2 (2017). Separation of powers and federalism, notes Kavanaugh,
“are not mere matters of etiquette or architecture, but are essential to protecting individual
liberty.” Brett M. Kavanaugh, Keynote Address: Two Challenges for the Judge as Umpire: Statutory
Ambiguity and Constitutional Exceptions, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1907, 1909 (2017) [hereinafter Two Challenges for the Judge as Umpire]. Prior to ascending to the Court, Justice Kavanaugh
wrote: “the Framers understood that a bill of rights without a structure to protect those
rights would be largely meaningless.” Brett M. Kavanaugh, Our Anchor for 225 Years and
Counting: The Enduring Significance of the Precise Text of the Constitution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1907, 1909 (2014). However, his conception of liberty is framed around “freedom from government regulation,” and not positive rights. Kavanaugh, Two Challenges for the Judge as Umpire, supra, at 1916. His approach to unenumerated rights is similarly constrained. He lauds
the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist for “his view that unenumerated rights could be
recognized by the courts only if the asserted right was rooted in the nation’s history and tradition.” Brett Kavanaugh, From the Bench: The Constitutional Statesmanship of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, AM. ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, 16 (2017). Amending the Constitution is the only way
to change the profile of constitutional rights. Otherwise, courts would be “snatching that
constitutional or legislative authority for themselves.” Id. at 4.
279.
See, e.g., Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (“There are risks when the
judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the history of the Lochner era
demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention
become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court.”).
280.
See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)
(“[O]ur cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative
right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or
property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”). Litigant
attempts to characterize positive rights as mere negative rights may be rebuffed. See, e.g.,
Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 364–65 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (“[T]he allegations state
the violation of a negative right. But a violation of negative rights is not what the Complaint
truly seems to argue. . . . Complaint points exclusively to a positive-right argument: Plaintiffs
are entitled to a minimum level of instruction on learning to read, yet the State, vis-à-vis Defendants, has failed to give it to them. The Court will therefore construe the Complaint in
that manner.”).
281.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2620 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
282.
See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (holding that a double-bond
prerequisite for appealing FED action does violate the equal protection clause the Court
stated “the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill.
We are unable to perceive . . . any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality . . . Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and
the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions.”).
283.
See, e.g., Martin A. Schwartz, Due Process and Fundamental Rights, 17 TOURO L. REV.
237, 237 (2016) (“In more recent years, the Supreme Court has consistently expressed its
reluctance to expand the doctrine of substantive due process, claiming that it poses a threat
to the legitimacy of the Court’s decision-making processes.”). Justice Thomas has rebuked
the Court for favoring “judicially created rights” over “rights actually enumerated in the
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284

(1) appointed, non-accountable judges should not superimpose their positions on society under principles
285
of representative democracy;
(2) adjudicating such rights devalues political debates,
286
particularly at state and local levels;
(3) courts cannot address unanticipated consequences or
287
problems emanating from newly-recognized rights;
and
(4) rights have an aura of permanency that can exceed
288
expectations or be hard to undo or adapt.
Grassroots recognition of expansive new rights or duties among
lower courts may fare no better. Over the last decade, federal
courts have rejected calls to recognize (a) duties to protect public

Constitution.” See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2329 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Alternatively, Justice Kennedy opined in Schuette v. Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291 (2014) that arguments favoring judicial solutions to complex
policies are:
inconsistent with the underlying premises of a responsible, functioning democracy. One of those premises is that a democracy has the capacity—and the duty—to
learn from its past mistakes; to discover and confront persisting biases; and by respectful, rational deliberation to rise above those flaws and injustices. That process is impeded, not advanced, by court decrees based on the proposition that the
public cannot have the requisite repose to discuss certain issues.
Id. at 312–13.
284.
See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2624 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Those who founded our country . . . would never have imagined yielding . . . on a question of social policy to
unaccountable and unelected judges.”).
285.
See id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Five lawyers have closed the debate and
enacted their own vision of marriage as a matter of constitutional law.”); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion is the product of a Court,
which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called
homosexual agenda.”).
286.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.”).
287.
See id. at 720 (“But we have always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area
are scarce and open-ended.”) (internal citation omitted). Contra Erwin Chemerinsky, Washington v. Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1501 (2008). See also Obergefell,
135 S. Ct. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Federal courts are blunt instruments when it
comes to creating rights. . . . [T]hey do not have the flexibility of legislatures to address concerns of parties not before the court or to anticipate problems that may arise.”).
288.
See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2624 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“But those whose
views do not prevail . . . can gear up to raise the issue later, hoping to persuade enough on
the winning side to think again. That is exactly how our system of government is supposed
to work.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“One of the benefits of leaving regulation of this matter to the people rather than to
the courts is that the people, unlike judges, need not carry things to their logical conclusion.”).

218

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 53:1

289

school students against onsite gun violence or offsite physical
290
abuse; (b) requirements to act to prevent further harms from
291
gun-related violence in a private nightclub; (c) rights to primary
292
293
or secondary education; (d) rights to higher education; or (e)
294
“rights to literacy.”
C. Parameters of the Right
Against this backdrop, judicial recognition of a right to public
health necessitates precision crafting along a narrow constitutional
route. Clearly, it cannot be framed in terms of a generalized right
to health services guaranteeing individual health care coverage for
295
all. The Supreme Court has considered and rejected this notion.
Nor is it about assuring all Americans are free from the threats of
communicable diseases, chronic conditions, or avoidable injuries.
As noted initially, these are aspirational goals, not parameters for
296
constitutional rights.
As illustrated in Figure 4, consistent with constitutional infer297
ences, recognizing new, unenumerated rights starts with the
289.
L.S. v. Peterson, No. 18-cv-61577, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210273, at *10–12 (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 12, 2018) (finding that law enforcement officials did not violate the due process clause
by not intervening during the Parkland, Florida school shooting); Adeel Hassan, Officers
Don’t Have Duty to Help, U.S. Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2018, at A19.
290.
See Doe v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 855–56 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding
that the special relationship between students and public schools does not create a constitutional duty to ensure student safety related to violence outside the school, notably molestation by a person pretending to be the student’s father).
291.
Vielma v. Gruler, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1131 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (finding no due process violation related to an officer who failed to enter a nightclub to neutralize a shooter
who went on to murder forty-nine people and injure fifty-three others concluding that due
process does not include an affirmative right to government aid, even when it may be necessary to secure otherwise protected rights).
292.
Martinez v. Malloy, 350 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D. Conn. 2018). Contra Complaint at 2, A.C.
v. Raimondo, No. 1:18-cv-645 (D.R.I. Nov. 18, 2018) (awaiting decision on similar right to
education claims).
293.
Salau v. Denton, 139 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1004 (W.D. Mo. 2015) (rejecting a University
of Missouri student’s due process claims arising from a disciplinary proceeding on the
grounds that a violation could not proceed because there is no constitutionally protected
right to a public college education); see also Simms v. Pa. State Univ., No. 3:17-cv-201, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45051, at *13–14 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2018) (finding no right to a college
education where a Penn State student faced disciplinary and criminal charges after an oncampus altercation).
294.
Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 366 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (holding children do
not have a right of access to literacy under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the clause does not “demand that a state affirmatively provide each
child with a defined, minimum level of education by which the child can attain literacy”); see
also Jacey Fortin, Judge Rejects Detroit Students’ Lawsuit Ruling “Adequate Education” Is Not a
Right, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 5, 2018, at A11.
295.
See supra Part IV.A.
296.
See supra Part IV.A.
297.
See supra Introduction.
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identification of a known vice for which a constitutional solution
may follow. Structural principles may suffice to stymie generalized
vices. Generating more specific remedies tied to some identified
vices requires consideration of auxiliary, creative, or ghost rights.
In any of these scenarios, courts may presumably craft either positive (+) or negative (-) rights. Thus, there are at least twenty-four
distinct options for generating a right to public health presuming a
vice is identified. Given extreme judicial reticence in the modern
298
era to directly recognize positive rights, realistic, viable options
for a right to public health lie among the twelve remaining options
centered on the recognition of negative rights to counter specific
vices.
FIGURE 4. RIGHTS OPTIONS EXTENDING FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL INFERENCES

The premier question is whether a national failure to provide
routine, efficacious population health services implicates a consti299
300
tutional vice for which a remedy must flow. Clearly, it does.

298.
See supra Part IV.B.
299.
That remedies flow from identified constitutional vices is analogous to concomitant
remedies for specific wrongs arising from tort law and policy. See, e.g., Curlender v. Bio-Sci.
Labs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 814, 830 (1980) (citing Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 178 (Cal.
1967)) (“[W]e have long adhered to the principle that there should be a remedy for every
wrong committed. ‘Fundamental in our jurisprudence is the principle that for every wrong
there is a remedy and that an injured party should be compensated for all damage proximately caused by the wrongdoer.’”).
300.
See Hodge, Jr., supra note 121, at 310 (“There is perhaps no facet of governmental
regulation more important to the public welfare than the maintenance of public health . . .
American public health law is as old as the formation of the colonies themselves. It owes its
early origins to the need of colonial governments to protect the public health for the literal
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Professor Amar asserts that the Constitution mandates the provision of “minimal entitlements” including sustenance and other
301
basic services, plausibly including public health protections. He
frames entitlements largely in the realm of property interests
grounded in affirmative requirements under the Thirteenth
Amendment, among other claims. “[W]hether we begin with a vision of individual dignity and human rights, or . . . stress the structural requirements of . . . government, we are led to the idea of
302
guaranteed minimal entitlements,” including minimum suste303
nance and shelter.
So why doesn’t the Constitution expressly address these entitlements? Professor Parmet purports that the Framers’ expectation
that government protect the public’s health obviated any need for
express constitutional language authorizing public health services
304
or powers. “The assertion that the framers assumed a public
health obligation on the part of government,” notes Parmet, “is
surprisingly compatible with modified versions of [Lockean or republican] theories, and may even highlight the ways in which the
framing generation interwove theories that, considered abstractly,
305
appear antagonistic.” That governments, notably sovereign states
306
307
or tribes, hold inherent and irrevocable public health powers is

survival of the community . . . Public health law then was as much a necessary practice as it
was a governmental responsibility.”).
301.
Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements,
13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (1990).
302.
Id. at 43.
303.
Id. at 39.
304.
Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the
State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 270–71 (1993) (“[U]nderstanding of
public health law in the framing era may have comported with the political theories prevalent at the time, especially liberalism, republicanism, and social contract theory.”).
305.
Id. at 306.
306.
The role of government to protect the public’s health has been affirmed by the Supreme Court for hundreds of years. In early cases like Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), the
Court accepted that states and localities have a fundamental role in protecting public
health. Id. at 178–79. See also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 280 (2006) (referring to
states’ “police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons”) (internal citation omitted); McDonald v. City of Chicago., 561 U.S.
742, 901 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ability to respond to the social ills associated with dangerous weapons goes to the very core of the States’ police powers.”). In Phalen v.
Virginia, 49 U.S. 163 (1850), the Court stated that “the suppression of nuisances injurious to
public health or morality is among the most important duties of government.” Id. at 168. In
Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), the Court said in dicta that “[t]he police
power of a state extends beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community.” Id. at
640 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
307.
See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819 (1880) (“No legislature can bargain
away the public health or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less
their servants. The supervision of both these subjects of governmental power is continuing
in its nature, and they are to be dealt with as the special exigencies of the moment may require. Government is organized with a view to their preservation, and cannot divest itself of
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largely a given helps explain the absence of affirmative constitutional language effectuating public health protections. The Framers did not need to state what is obvious—that government must
act in the interests of societal health.
This constitutional absence, however, does not resolve whether
the federal government has a distinct role in public health promotion. To the contrary, principles of federalism suggest (at least in
theory) that reserving sovereign police powers to the states
through the Tenth Amendment may actually negate a federal role
in protection of the public’s health. That is, to the extent police
powers used historically and primarily to protect the public’s
health are allotted to the states, there must be little to no role or
responsibility for the federal government to intervene in the same
308
sphere.
Even if this premise pervaded early judicial conceptions, cumulative assessments of federalism recognize that the division of fed309
eral and state powers is by no means a clean split. Federal and
state governments share significant responsibilities over an array of
310
public duties, including public health. Expansive interpretations
of federal commerce and tax powers during the New Deal era are
often tied directly to the national government’s role in public
311
312
health and the environment. Among a unified nation of states,
the national role is essential to thwart eminent national public
health threats and needs. In the modern era, the federal governthe power to provide for them.”); see also New Orleans Gas Co. v. La. Light Co., 115 U.S. 650,
668 (1885) (disallowing states from contractually limiting the exercise of police powers related to public health and the public morals. “The preservation of these [powers] is so necessary to the best interests of social organization, that a wise policy forbids the legislative
body to divest itself of the power to enact laws for the preservation of health and the repression of crime.”) (internal citation omitted).
308.
This proposition is asserted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Jacobson v.
Massachusetts. 197 U.S. 1(1905). See supra Part II.A.
309.
See, e.g., PARMET, supra note 4, at 96–104 (examining the role of federalism in relation to different and overlapping responsibilities of federal and state governments to promote population health); see also Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our
Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 1532–33 (1995) (arguing that cooperative federalism allows states continued power in the realm of public health while providing national protections under minimum federal standards).
310.
See Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62
UCLA L. REV. 74, 116–19 (2015) (discussing the successes of cooperative federalism in the
establishment of health care exchanges under the ACA, the Clean Water Act, and the Clean
Air Act).
311.
Alex Kreit & Aaron Marcus, Raich, Health Care, and the Commerce Clause, 31 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 957, 995 (2005) (overviewing the expansion of federal intervention in the
public health arena during the 1900s).
312.
See, e.g., PARMET, supra note 4, at 82 (“From the New Deal until the 1990s, the Supreme Court adopted a highly deferential stance toward both state and federal laws that either appeared to protect public health or purported to do so.”); see also Hodge, Jr., supra
note 121, at 338 (explaining how the New Deal provided “fertile ground” for the growth of
federal intervention into public health).
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ment unquestionably possesses immense powers to address the
313
public’s health. Declinations to adequately and uniformly wield
these powers over time and across administrations contribute to
negative health repercussions.
Millions of Americans needlessly suffer each year from preventable causes of morbidity and mortality across an array of physical
and mental health conditions. The interests of individuals and the
body politic in public health protections are intrinsic to every oth314
er right bestowed constitutionally. Yet, as Professor Gostin has eloquently espoused, no citizen, group, entity, or state can accomplish alone what the national government can assure collectively to
315
protect the public’s health. Failure in this regard reflects more
than poor political choices by an administration or legislative excuses framed as funding limitations. It is a constitutional vice tied
most closely to malfeasance, notably government’s failure to act in
316
the interests of the public’s health despite an obligation to do so.
The Framers understood this essential role of government; the
Court should acknowledge it as well.
Constitutional recognition of a right to public health embodies
a fundamental governmental responsibility to respect the essential
public health needs of populations. It is about a national commitment to properly balance government interests in protecting and
promoting health across populations through efficacious public
health interventions. Generating a constitutional remedy to address the identified vice of national public health failures prompts
three distinct possibilities. First, the Court could craft a right to
public health from a patchwork of provisions as it has done previ317
ously through auxiliary rights to privacy or citizenship. Yet the
Court has already signaled in prior jurisprudence and modern

313.
See, e.g., GOSTIN, supra note 4, at 98 (“The federal government possesses considerable authority to act and exerts extensive control in the realm of public health and safety.”);
see also Wendy K. Mariner et al., Jacobson v. Massachusetts: It’s Not Your Great-Grandfather’s Public Health Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 581 (2005) (describing the important role the federal
government plays in public health promotion).
314.
See, e.g., Jonathan M. Mann et al., Health and Human Rights, in HEALTH AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 7, 11–18 (Jonathan M. Mann et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that public health is essential to fulfilling the requirements of the International Bill of Human Rights, which parallel
similar rights expressly and impliedly guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution).
315.
See Lawrence O. Gostin, Mapping the Issues: Public Health, Law and Ethics, in PUBLIC
HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER 2 (2d ed., 2010) (“Individuals can do a great deal to
safeguard their health, particularly if they have the economic means to do so. . . . Yet there is
a great deal that individuals cannot do to secure their health, and therefore these individuals need to organize and collaborate on building infrastructure and developing shared resources. Acting alone, people cannot achieve environmental protection, hygiene and sanitation, clean air and surface water, uncontaminated food and drinking water, safe roads and
products, or control of infectious disease.”).
316.
See supra Part I.D.
317.
See supra Part III.A.
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views its reticence to bring together bits and pieces of constitutional language to generate new wholesale rights. Textualists like Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh would likely object vehemently to the
318
Court’s machinations in this regard.
Second, the Court might reconsider its interpretation of rights
to life or liberty under substantive due process in an exercise of
319
creative righting. However, modern calls for the Court to amplify
due process interests in other contexts unrelated to the public’s
health have fallen flat. Through either auxiliary or creative righting, tying a constitutional right to public health to a re-purposed
interpretation of enumerated rights, or penumbras of such rights,
only heightens the Court’s queasiness over expansions of fairly320
settled norms.
By process of elimination, principles of ghost righting may appear as a final option to generate a right to public health. In reality, it is the premier route to effectuate the right. Remedying malfeasance embedded in national failures to act in the interests of
the public’s health through ghost righting makes constitutional
sense. Exercises of ghost righting allow for legitimate expansions of
constitutional conceptions unmoored to existing provisions
weighed down by decades of limitations. Unlike enumerated rights
designed to inhibit explicit vices, ghost righting is premised on the
need to address non-explicit ones. Even if the Framers recognized
government’s role in protecting communal health, they could not
have imagined how advancements in public health sciences and
practices would vault such efforts beyond sovereign states to the
national level. Members of every branch of government can now
envision a defined public health role for the federal government,
but too often selectively choose to ignore it. While the Constitution

318.
See, e.g., Two Challenges for the Judge as Umpire, supra note 278, at 1916; Nancie G.
Marzulla, The Textualism of Clarence Thomas: Anchoring the Supreme Court’s Property Jurisprudence
to the Constitution, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 351, 683 (2002) (discussing Justice
Thomas’ “fidelity to textualism and original intent”).
319.
See supra Part III.B.
320.
The Supreme Court’s reticence to play an overly-active role in adjudicating new
rights or standards for national implementation is unquestionably a factor to the extent federal agencies may be well-positioned to respond via delegations of powers via Congress. See,
e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 428–29 (2011) (“[Federal executive
agencies are] surely better equipped to [regulate greenhouse gases] than individual district
judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions. Federal judges lack the scientific, economic,
and technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order . . . .
Judges may not commission scientific studies or convene groups of experts for advice, or
issue rules under notice-and-comment procedures inviting input by any interested person,
or seek the counsel of [State] regulators . . . . Rather, judges are confined by a record comprising the evidence the parties present. Moreover, federal district judges, sitting as sole adjudicators, lack authority to render precedential decisions binding other judges, even members of the same court.”).
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is not designed to remedy every last ill that Americans may suffer,
it is capable of interpretations that alleviate harms only government, particularly federal, can mend. Malfeasance embedded in
national failures to protect the public’s health finds its cure in
ghost righting.
A right to public health is a distinct right embedded in the fabric of a Constitution drafted with sufficient flexibility to allow its
recognition as an essential role of government. It takes form most
clearly as a negative right that government not impede absent sufficient justification. What may constitute a “sufficient justification”
for breaching a right to public health is subject to further adjudication, although it may clearly surpass a mere rational basis for fail322
ures to act under principles of substantive due process. Like most
323
negative rights, however, it also requires something more than
idle responses by governments to public health threats that impair
324
individual or group entitlements to a healthier society. Delineating the contours and breadth of services owed to Americans via a
ghost right to public health is reserved for further exploration pursuant to a suitable “case or controversy” persuasively arguing for its
325
existence. For now, it is enough to chart a course for bringing a
321.
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32 (1973) (quoting
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)) (“[T]he Constitution does not provide judicial
remedies for every social and economic ill.”).
322.
The Supreme Court’s treatment of claims expressing a right to education provides
an apt example. Despite the Court’s reticence to recognize such rights in Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
at 18, it later arguably employed a heightened form of scrutiny in invalidating a Texas statute that allowed local school districts to refuse schooling to undocumented kids in Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 203 (1982). In Plyer, the Court stressed that a complete denial of education to a suspect class requires “something more than a rational basis.” Id. at 235.
323.
Parmet, supra note 304, at 331 (discussing the Framers’ views on public health and
arguing that constitutional rights were not “purely negative” but dependent on reciprocal
obligations).
324.
The Supreme Court affirmed the need for positive government obligations in negatively phrased rights. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1698 (2017) (citing
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984)) (stating rights to equal protection can be
remedied via a positive extension of benefits to excluded classes); see also Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiring the state to furnish an indigent with a free transcript of the
trial); David P. Currie, Positive & Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 884
(1986) (citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)) (“[T]he Court invoked not the
right to counsel or due process but equal protection to hold that a state must provide counsel to represent an indigent on appeal.”).
325.
A case may potentially be framed consistent with plaintiffs’ claims in Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1251 (D. Or. 2016). See discussion supra Part III.A. In Juliana,
plaintiffs allege substantial harms from the environment stemming from federal failures to
address climate change over decades. Similarly-situated plaintiffs directly impacted by poor
public health, environmentalists or outcomes unrelated to their specific behaviors or choices may petition the government for remedies to address long-standing injuries and harms.
As in Juliana, viable remedies may only flow if plaintiffs can demonstrate a federal constitutional obligation. Plaintiffs in Juliana focus on an expansion of substantive due process to
frame a “right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life.” Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d
at 1251. In a future case centered on a right to public health, ghost righting presents a viable option to an auxiliary righting route pursued in Juliana.
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principled case with the goal of generating a right that citizens are
owed, and government must respect.
CONCLUSION
Generating a constitutionally-viable argument for the existence
of a right to public health by no means assures it will be recognized. Odds against it may seem long. National politics focus more
on assuring healthcare access than public health services. The public is either unaware of or apathetic to base level public health efforts. Industries directly lobby against public health services that
tamp down sales or profits. Congress insufficiently funds responses
to known public health threats like infectious diseases, opioid misuse, and obesity, as well as behind-the-scenes communal health
services. The Supreme Court seems extremely reluctant to expand
interpretations of existing rights, much less engage in ghost righting to craft new duties on government. Yet, therein lies a key in
this latter observation. A ghost right to public health is not about
thrusting new duties onto government. Rather, it is about recognizing a duty that government always had, framed appropriately
around a collective right owed to the public.
Promoting and protecting the public’s health are not optional
services. They are prime responsibilities for government at every
level. The soundness of a right to public health extends from the
reality that organized society absent these services is unhealthy and
unsustainable. Effectuation of every other right citizens are owed,
whether enumerated or not, starts first with their capacity to exercise them. A right to public health makes that possible for every
American, not just those who can afford a higher standard of living. As the remedy for an identified vice, the right is about providing Americans an opportunity for improved communal health
through sustained services applied equitably across populations nationally.

